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ABSTRACT 
The Unites States’ first space systems programs, to include launch, ground, and space 
segments and their associated infrastructure, were initially developed to meet the requirements of 
the strategic users.  Since the 1991 Gulf War, there has been a growing dependence on the 
capabilities and support delivered by those programs to meet requirements of non-strategic users.  
The current National Security Space (NSS) architecture makes it rather difficult and challenging 
for all but critical strategic users to fully capitalize on the available assets.  Timelines that were 
once adequate to deliver strategic capabilities are now not sufficient to allow a broader range of 
users to realize the benefit from using the available space systems.  In addition, the non-strategic 
users run into challenges when they attempt to change the tasking requirements that would 
enable them to receive associated products / services that are useful and timely.   
With the identified gaps in the current NSS environment, the Integrated Product Team 
(IPT), consisting of ten active duty military students, sought solutions to make space more 
“Operationally Responsive” to its customers by 2025.  Due to limited time and assets, the IPT 
narrowed the focus of the project to the four Joint Publication (JP) 3-14 “Joint Doctrine for 
Space Operations” mission areas of Space Support, Space Control, Force Enhancement, and 
Force Application.   
During this project, the IPT defined Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) from its 
perspective, developed the requirements to meet the identified NSS gaps, selected the final 
alternatives to satisfy those requirements, and suggested an implementation plan.  While in the 
architecture process, the IPT conducted an in-depth evaluation of the original [61] alternatives 
based on Responsiveness, Risk, Capability, and Cost.  After building a foundation for further 
analysis, a total of 16 alternatives were chosen for the final ORS architecture.   
The IPT’s leading alternative that provided the most responsiveness was to create a 
Single Space Agency.  The other alternatives range from establishing joint ventures with other 
countries to developing hypersonic lift vehicles to transport troops and supplies.  A detailed list 
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PREFACE 
SS4051 is the second course of a two course sequence which comprises the capstone 
project for the Space Systems Operations program at NPS.  SS3041, the initial course, teaches 
the students the architectural design process – from generating basic requirements through 
conceiving of and evaluating alternative solutions and ultimately selecting the preferred 
approach.  During SS3041, the students are presented a project – derived from current 
challenging and relevant efforts in the National Security Space area – and their primary 
“deliverable” at the completion of the class is a set of requirements for the assigned architecture 
to satisfy. 
For the FY2008 effort, Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) was selected as the topic 
of study.  In SS3041, the students defined what ORS “should be,” and described the 
characteristics and capabilities of an ORS architecture.  In SS4051, the students took these 
definitions and capabilities and generated alternative approaches to satisfying them.  This report 
describes the result of that effort. 
For FY2008, there were two in-residence teams of 10 students, and a single distance-
learning team of 7 students.  While most of the in-residence students had no space-related 
experience other than their time in the Space Systems Program at NPS, the majority of the 
distance-learning students had worked in or were currently working in space-related jobs. 
 
  xii 
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I. FORWARD  
 The Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Architecture Project was completed to fulfill 
the requirements of a combined series of courses, SS3041 Space Systems Operations I and 
SS4051 Space Systems Operations II, both elements of the Space Systems Operations degree 
curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.  “Team A” consisted of 
active duty personnel from the Navy, the Army and the Marine Corps.  Operational experience 
of the group ranged from staff tours to combat deployments and the combined service time of the 
group totaled over 170 years.  Only two of the ten members have had direct experience in the 
National Security Space Enterprise, one during a tour at Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center 
and the other as the Space Battle Lab Liaison officer to the Army’s Command General Staff 
College.  However, all members have used products or services supplied by the current space 
architecture at one time or another.  This project was completed using the knowledge acquired 
during the course of study and influenced by the team’s operational experience 
 During both SS3041 and SS4051, the team was purposely given little “strategic” 
guidance to allow for the application of original thought in analyzing a topic that is of current 
interest to the National Security Space (NSS) community and perhaps develop a viable solution 
to the challenge of providing applicable and useful space related capabilities across a wide 
spectrum of users.   
 This project incorporated or referenced many of the thoughts and ideas developed by 
other attempts to define and implement ORS.  However, due to limited time and assets, the group 
narrowed the focus of the project to the four Joint Publication (JP) 3-14 “Joint Doctrine for 
Space Operations” mission areas of Space Support, Space Control, Force Enhancement and 
Force Application.  The group acknowledges that there are many other considerations that would 
need to be addressed to truly integrate responsive space across the spectrum of users.  Any 
opinions expressed in this paper are those of the members of “Team A” and do not necessarily 
reflect those of the Space Systems Academic Group, the Naval Postgraduate School, or the 
Department of Defense. 
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 The ORS project was unconstrained by any doctrine or policy.  The Integrated Program 
Team (IPT), also known as Team A, created a final ORS architecture by, first, developing an 
ORS definition and requirements for the year 2025, and second,  developing alternatives to 
satisfy those requirements.  According to Team A’s perspective of ORS, it touches all aspects of 
space or space related capabilities.  ORS is an end state, a target that will guide the NSS 
architecture investment decisions for the next 17 years. 
 During this project, Team A equated themselves to a Task Force or a consultation firm, 
organized to determine an architecture and suggest a possible implementation in the broadest 
sense.  The team took the point of view that their “services” would no longer be required once 
the final decision was presented and the architecture implemented.   
 
A. BACKGROUND ON CLASS PROJECT 
 The class project was conducted during two twelve-week courses at Naval Postgraduate 
School: SS3041 Space Systems Operations I and SS4051 Space Systems Operations II.  The 
team used their operational experience and class knowledge to develop the final ORS 
architecture.   
 
SS3041: Space Systems Operations I 
 During SS3041, the goal was to define ORS and develop the requirements for the ORS 
architecture to fulfill the gaps found in the current NSS architecture.  The team was influenced 
by current space efforts but was given free reign for creativity and out-of-the-box thinking.  
Due to time constraints, the team narrowed the scope to only cover the JP 3-14 mission areas.  
This portion of the project was mainly focused on the “what.”   
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SS4051: Space Systems Operations II 
 During SS4051, the goal was to develop the final ORS architecture.  The team developed 
alternatives to meet the requirements and then evaluated the alternatives against four criteria.  
Once the evaluation phase was complete, the team selected and implemented the best solution 
for ORS.  Team A kept all research to open source and unclassified resources due to time 
constraints and other obligations.  This portion of the project was mainly focused on the 
“how.” 
 
B. WHY DO ORS? 
 The Unites States’ first space system programs (launch, ground, space segments as well 
as infrastructure) were developed with the strategic user in mind.  Since the 1991 Gulf War, there 
has been a growing reliance on the capabilities and support delivered by those programs by non-
strategic users (the military, other governmental agencies, the Intelligence Community (IC), etc).  
The current NSS architecture is still highly vertically oriented and not optimally utilized by the 
wide range of customers.  Timelines that were once adequate to deliver strategic capability are 
not appropriate to allow a broader range of users to input desired tasking and to receive 
associated products / services that are useful and that are delivered when needed.   
 For this paper, the approach, purpose and the products are similar to the Responsive 
Space Operations (RSO) study conducted in 2004 – 2005 by the National Security Space Office 
(NSSO).  The project began by listing potential requirements for any needed space support 
product or service based on a forecast of the political and military environment for the year 2025.  
The purpose focused on determining, evaluating and implementing potential solutions for a 
national space architecture that meets those requirements in an adequate amount of time to make 
that product or service useful for its intended purposes.  Team A attempted to evaluate a range of 
alternatives across JP 3-14 defined mission areas sought to change and or improve current 
capabilities where they may be adequate or to develop new capabilities where gaps exist.  The 
products of this study are a list of recommended capabilities the NSS architecture will be able to 
provide in 2025 and a list of suggestions for implementing the architecture. 
 
 5 
C. CURRENT & FUTURE NSS ENVIRONMENT 
 Today, NSS is unable to meet the demanding needs of the U.S. Armed Forces.  Space 
systems are still stove-piped, leaving no support to the tactical and operational users.  The 
acquisition process is lengthy (10 – 15 years) and uncoordinated among agencies and 
Department of Defense (DOD).  Products from the space assets are highly classified and difficult 
for others to access due to poor user knowledge.  There is no single entity that determines the 
tasking of space assets, creating confusion and poor organizational management.  Current launch 
system architecture is unable to meet short-notice launches (less than 6 months in length).  The 
current architecture is unable to replace a failed or neutralized satellite in a timely manner to be 
effective to its customers.      
Before defining ORS, Team A forecasted what the strategic environment would be in 
2025.  By 2025: 
• United States (U.S.) will have at least two near-peer military competitors   
• Global terrorism will still be a major issue 
• Numerous nations will have space capabilities rivaling the U.S.’s 
• Global economic interdependency (borderless world) will exist 
• Neutrality of space may be contested 
In essence, space capabilities will continue to grow in importance on a global scale.  The current 
NSS environment is unable to compete with these future challenges.  In order for the U.S. to be 
more competitive in the space arena during the 2025 timeframe, space must be more responsive 
to all users.   
 
D. TEAM A DEFINITION OF ORS 
Team A defined ORS as: 
 
An adaptive architecture of physical and organizational structures that 
delivers space capabilities and effects to the warfighters, the intelligence 
community, and Department of Defense users in sufficient time to benefit 
tactical, operational, and strategic requirements. 
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The three customers of ORS are DOD users, IC, and the warfighters.  Although other 
customers such as NASA and NOAA could benefit from this study, Team A chose to limit the 
scope of the project to defense organizations only.  DOD includes DOD agencies, military 
departments, Combatant Commands (COCOM).  DOD users are stationary users who are shore-
based.  IC is “all departments or agencies of a government that are concerned with intelligence 
activities, either in an oversight, managerial, support, or participatory role” (JP 1-02).  IC 
includes organizations such as Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Geospatial Agency 
(NGA), and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).  The unofficial term of warfighter is any 
deployed or moving member of U.S. Armed Forces whether it is at sea, on the battlefield, or in 
the air (i.e. the “trigger pullers”).   
The three utility categories are tactical, operational, and strategic.  The term tactical 
means actions related to a “battlefield” or “neighborhood,” usually smaller unit actions.  The 
term operational refers to campaign level actions, actions related to an “Area of Operation,” or 
sustaining efforts.  Strategic efforts include national and multi-national objectives, including 
actions related to “National Security” and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).   
The two parts to ORS are physical and organizational structures.  Examples of physical 
structures include launch facilities, satellites, new technologies, etc…  Examples of 
organizational structures include acquisitions, chain-of-command, international partnerships, 
space operations center, etc… 
ORS will provide an end-to-end and top-to-bottom perspective that, when established, 
will respond appropriately across a broad range of time scales to changing situations and stated 
tasking.  These time scales range from short-term pop-up crisis situations to long-term 
persistence.  Although Team A sought to develop a broader capability base, there will always be 
strategic requirements for space capabilities.  The team must be careful not to shift the focus of 
the NSS architecture too far towards the tactical user, but rather implement a balanced 
architecture.  Further, Team A hopes to develop an architecture that has an organic capability to 
shift its focus when changing needs are required and thus eliminating the need for further ORS 
“Office” efforts.  The bottom line is that ORS should be able to deliver the desired space 
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capability to the right customer at the right time.  The right time depends on the user and the 
situation where the effect is required.  
 
E. ORS REQUIREMENTS 
 The ORS requirements were divided into the four JP 3-14 space mission areas: space 
control, force enhancement, space support, and space force application.  These requirements 
were based on deficiencies or gaps in today’s NSS environment.  Each mission area had its own 
set of requirements needed to satisfy the customers in 2025.  See Appendix A for the list of the 
ORS requirements. 
 
F. ORS ALTERNATIVES 
 The alternatives that were evaluated during the final selection phase were created to meet 
each mission area’s requirements.  Team A brainstormed a total of sixty-one alternatives that 
were later evaluated against the chosen criteria.  There were at least two alternatives for each 
requirement.  See Appendix B for the list of the original alternatives used during the evaluation 
phase.   
 8 
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III. ARCHITECTURE PROCESS 
 In order to develop a final architecture, the team employed a process that was taught 
during SS3041.  This process assisted the team in selecting the best solution to satisfy the gaps 
from the current space environment.  Figure 1 depicts the architecture process that Team A used 
to develop its alternatives, and ultimately, the final architecture for ORS.  The following sections 
describe each phase of the process. 
 
Figure 1: Architecture Process (SS 3041 Lecture Series 3b / Summer 2007) 
 
A. DESIRED CAPABILITIES & OBJECTIVES 
 During the “Desired Capabilities & Objectives” phase, Team A defined ORS and 
developed a list of requirements that was used to fulfill the gaps in the current NSS environment.  
These requirements were developed in SS3041.  Appendix A shows the list of the ORS 
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requirements developed by Team A.  These requirements are based on Team A’s perspective of 
ORS.  During this phase, Team A answered the question: “what” is ORS? 
 
B. TECHNOLOGY FORECAST 
 During the “Technology Forecast” phase, Team A answered the following questions 
according to each mission area: 
• What technologies will or will not be mature by 2025? 
• What technologies are well-proven today? 
The goal of this phase was to address any technologies that will not be available by 2025 and 
remove those suggested alternatives early on during the process, saving time to discuss more 
important issues.  Those long-term requirements developed in the first phase may be highly 
contested during the technology forecast segment.  
 
C. CONSTRAINTS / RESTRAINTS 
 Team A considered possible constraints and restraints that could pose possible setbacks 
or challenges to the future ORS architecture.  A constraint is a “must do” activity such as 
obeying international laws or going through the acquisition process.  A restraint is a “can’t do” 
activity such as the inability to defy the laws of gravity or the inability to spend more than what 
is budgeted.  Most of the constraints / restraints were applicable across the board of the mission 
areas.  Only some of these constraints are universal to all four mission areas.  Below is a list of 
the possible constraints and restraints that Team A developed during this segment. 
• Finite resources (time and money) 
• Applicability to all levels of utility to all customers  
• Technology 
• Loss of technological superiority  
• Acquisition process  
• Interfaces / Interoperability  
• International Treaties / Political ramifications of actions 
• Current Policy / Law / Doctrine / Regulations 
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• Physics (orbital mechanics, Raleigh criteria, etc…) 
• Space environment (solar weather, space junk, etc…) 
• Launch hazards associated with populated areas or restricted air space 
 
D. CRITERIA  
 During the “Criteria” phase, Team A discussed potential factors that would assist in 
evaluating the initial set of alternatives.  The four criteria selected for the evaluation phase are 1) 
Responsiveness, 2) Cost, 3) Risk, and 4) Capability.  The team was able to create a quantitative 
score for each alternative.  These four factors will be discussed in great depth in the Method of 
Evaluation (MOE) chapter. 
 
E. DEVELOP ALTERNATIVES 
 During the “Develop Alternatives” phase, each mission area compiled a list of potential 
alternatives that met the requirements developed in the first phase.  After developing at least two 
alternatives for each requirement per mission area, Team A came up with the original sixty-one 
alternatives.  See Appendix B for the original list of alternatives.  During this phase, Team A 
answered the question: “how” will ORS be achieved?    
 
F. EVALUATION 
 During the “Evaluation” phase, Team A evaluated all sixty-one alternatives against the 
four criteria selected in an earlier phase. The evaluation phase allowed Team A to assess a list of 
alternatives ranked from top to bottom.  The outcome of this phase was to choose the top 
alternative from each sub-mission area, a total of fourteen alternatives, in order to include all 
aspects of space into the final ORS architecture.  This provided a foundation for the team to 
conduct additional trade-off analysis. The MOE will be discussed in depth in the next chapter.   
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G. SELECT & MODIFY ALTERNATIVES FOR FINAL ARCHITECTURE 
 After further discussions with trade-offs and constraints, Team A selected and / or 
modified a total of sixteen alternatives for the final ORS architecture.  These final sixteen 
alternatives are shown in Appendix E.  Team A did not consider current space capabilities in the 
final ORS architecture because they assumed some portions of the current architecture will 
remain in position until replaced by a new, already-planned architecture or until end of life (i.e. 
ICBM, GPS, AEHF, TACSAT, etc…).  Some of these alternatives resulted in a combination or a 
hybrid of numerous alternatives.  At least one alternative was chosen for each sub-mission area.  
The goal was to get the “biggest bang for the buck.”  Team A underwent two iterations of the 
“evaluation and selection” loop.  If time permitted, the team would have completed more 
iterations in order to conduct a more thorough analysis. 
 
H. IMPLEMENTATION 
 Now that the final sixteen alternatives were selected, the next phase is to determine how 
Team A’s suggested ORS architecture will be integrated into the current space environment.  
More detail to this phase will be included in a following chapter.   
 
I. VERIFICATION 
 The very last stage in this process was to ensure that the final ORS architecture satisfied 
all of the requirements developed in the first phase.  Those requirements that were not met would 
need further investigation on whether to accept or not accept the risk of not fulfilling those 
particular requirements and why.   Majority of the mission areas accepted the risk of having gaps 
because a different alternative partly contributed to the mission. 
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IV. METHOD OF EVALUATION 
During the MOE segment of the architecture process, the team began to develop a 
method that would be used to evaluate the alternatives that would be the eventual output of the 
evaluation phase.  Knowing that the alternatives would include a variety of different means to 
meet the established requirements, the team envisioned difficulties in comparing each alternative 
to another (i.e. comparing “apples to oranges”).  A quantitative analysis would provide the only 
way of comparing dissimilar alternatives.  The team developed a scheme that would rank each of 
the suggested alternatives by score and provide an objective view of which alternative was 
superior to another, regardless of category or mission area.  The score would include 
consideration of an alternative’s responsiveness, capability, risk, and cost.  Each of the areas to 
be evaluated was given a weight using a pair wise comparison method whereas each team 
member rated each evaluation area against the other.   The mean of all the members inputs were 
entered into an algorithm that used the Analytic Hierarchy process as implemented in the 
expertchoice®  decision support software to determine the weighting coefficients for the final 
score equation.  Two versions of the equation were developed; the first (Equation 1) contained 
variables for Responsiveness, Capability, Risk and Cost (RCRC) and the second (Equation 2) 
treated cost as an independent variable and was therefore not included.   
Where X1= 0.54 
           X2= 0.10  
           X3= 0.12 
           X4= 0.24 
(Inconsistency value of 0.02 where <0.1 is desirable) 
 
 
Where X1= 0.67 
           X2= 0.18  
           X3= 0.15 





The alternatives were ranked by their RCRC or RCR score from highest to lowest.  This 
aided the IPT in making decisions regarding which alternative(s) would be included in the final 
architecture.  Although a higher overall score was generally favored, consideration was also 
given to cost in the second analysis as well as gaps created in the requirements had a particular 
alternative been left out.  Each potential alternative was also measured against the constraints 
and restraints developed at the beginning of the architecture process.  To eliminate some 
alternatives, an assumption was made that some portions of the current space enterprise 
architecture (e.g. GPS BlkIII, AEHF, ICBM inventory, etc.) would fulfill requirements until 
replaced by a new capability or end of life of that system.  An explanation of each of the four 
criterion is included below. 
 
A. RESPONSIVENESS 
Responsiveness (R: Total Possible Points = 9):  
  
 Is alternative responsive to all customers across all utility levels? 
  
An alternative’s responsiveness score was determined a survey of space professionals (14 
total respondents; see App. C for Survey Instructions and Example Score Sheet).  Each 
alternative was evaluated for its responsiveness to each customer (DoD, IC, and Warfighter) at 
each utility level (Strategic, Operational, and Tactical).  For example, if a particular alternative 
was thought to be responsive to all three customers at all three utility levels that alternative 
would receive a nine (9).  If a particular alternative was thought to be responsive to each 
customer only on a tactical utility level that alternative would receive a three (3).  Maximum 
score for each alternative was nine (9) and the minimum was zero (0).  The mean score from all 
14 respondents was used as the responsiveness score for any particular alternative. 
B. CAPABILITY 
Capability (Ca: Total Possible Points = 3):   
 
 Does alternative maintain current capability, improve current capability, or create a new 
capability? 
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Capability was graded as an absolute; in other words no relative scale was applied.  A 
capability provided by a particular alternative was either an existing capability, an improved 
capability (incremental) or a completely new capability.  A new capability was given the highest 





Risk (Ri: Total Possible Points = 5):  
 
 What are the technological risks associated with selected alternatives? 
 Each alternative was given a risk score based on its Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 
as determined during the open source Technology Review portion of the architecting process.  












3 Completely New Capability 
2 Improved Capability  
1 Existing Capability 
Table 1: Capability Score Breakdown 
TRL Description Risk 
9 Actual system “flight proven” Low 
8 Actual system “flight qualified” Low 
7 Prototype demonstrated in space Low 
6 Prototype demonstration in relevant environnent Low 
5 Breadboard demonstrated in relevant environment Mod. 
4 Critical function demonstrated in lab Mod. 
3 Analytical/experimental proof of concept Mod. 
2 Conceptual design formulated High 
1 Basic principles observed High 
Table 2: TRL Levels 
Points TRL Level 
5 TRL 9 
4 TRL 7 & 8 
3 TRL 5 & 6 
2 TRL 3 & 4 
1 TRL 1 & 2 
Table 3: Risk Score Breakdown 
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D. COST 
Cost (C: Total Possible Points = 5): 
 
 Analysis of relative cost of capability to total architecture costs. 
 
For cost analysis the group developed five Cost Categories (or bins).  The bins were 
modeled in part to be similar to the DoD 5000 Acquisition Category sub-divisions and were 
intended to capture the relative ease (or difficulty) at which each alternative would pass the 
budgeting process.  Table 4 below show the breakup of cost category.  Where applicable and 
when the information was available, total cost estimates included those incurred for R&D and 
one year of Operation and Maintenance (O&M). 
Points Cost Categories (CostCat) 
5 < $ 100 M 
4 $ 100 M - $ 499 M 
3 $ 500 M - $ 1.49 B 
2 $ 1.5 B - $ 9.99 B 
1 >= $ 10 B  
Table 4: Cost Category Score 
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V. DECISION 
 The team began the selection process by choosing the top alternative from each of the JP 
3-14 mission and sub-mission areas, which provided fourteen alternatives that would serve as the 
beginning point for the trade-off analysis to follow. Four of the first fourteen alternatives were 
immediately dropped for the following reasons; an assumption that portions of the current NSSE 
architecture would remain until subsequently replaced or end of life negated the need for one of 
the alternatives, two alternatives were already incorporated into other mission areas and the final 
alternative dealt with developing doctrine for space weapons.  The remaining ten alternatives 
were validated for inclusion into the final architecture.  At that point each mission area IPT 
reviewed the original list of sixty-one alternatives to suggest any more that should be included 
based on the risk incurred of gapping requirements.  Each suggested alternative was evaluated 
based on its overall score, cost and feasibility of implementation.   This second to final iteration 
of trade-offs produced a list that included twenty-four alternatives.  During the last iteration of 
trade-offs ten alternatives were combined in whole and one was a hybrid of all of one and part of 
another to produce the final list of sixteen alternatives (The Sweet Sixteen).   Below is the OV-1 
diagram of the complete Team A ORS Architecture of sixteen alternatives with a total cost of 
$39.8B.  Each of the final alternatives will be discussed in depth in the following pages. 
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Figure 2: Team A ORS Architecture OV-1 Diagram 
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A. SPACE SUPPORT  
1. Definition  
 Combat service support operations to deploy and sustain military and intelligence 
systems in space.  The Space Support Mission Area includes launching and deploying space 
vehicles, maintaining and sustaining spacecraft on-orbit, and de-orbiting and recovering space 
vehicles, if required.  
2. Space Launch (SL) Final Alternative 
  SS.SL.2:  Modify current launch pad infrastructure (Cape Canaveral)  
 
 The final alternative to support the Space Launch (SL) mission area involves building 
two additional Delta Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Horizontal Integration 
Facilities (HIF’s) adjacent to the Delta launch pads at Cape Canaveral.  Additionally, two work 
shifts would be utilized at each HIF (three at Cape Canaveral and one at Vandenberg Air Force 
Base) and “plug and play” technology will be introduced into the Delta boosters.  Together, 
these three changes would drastically reduce pre-pad processing time for Delta vehicles from 
24 days to nine; would decrease on-pad processing time from ten days to three; would decrease 
post-launch pad refurbishment time from 20 days to ten; and would reduce booster trouble-
shooting/ repair times.  In turn, the launch capacity of the Delta EELV can be increased from 
approximately 14 per year (current launch rate) to as many as 124 per year.  When added to the 
launch capacity of the Atlas EELV, the overall launch capacity for the architecture will equal 
approximately 136 launches per year.  
In order to determine a realistic and cost-effective method of increasing the current 
launch capacity, and in turn, responsiveness, both the Delta and Atlas EELV’s were examined.  
As mentioned above, the Delta EELV utilizes horizontal integration to build-up its boosters 
and integrate its payloads.  By doing so, Delta is able to assemble the vehicle in a facility away 
from the launch pad, thus minimizing on-pad processing time, which allows for more 
throughputs on each of Delta’s four launch pads (three at Cape Canaveral, one at Vandenberg).  
Additionally, the Delta HIF contains three processing bays and two storage bays, allowing 
 20 
three separate boosters to be assembled simultaneously, while also providing room for two 
completed vehicles to be stored prior to launch.  
In comparison, the Atlas EELV utilizes Vertical Integration Facilities (VIF’s) to 
vertically build-up its boosters and integrate its payloads.  Within the VIF, there are only two 
bays for assembly and/ or storage, thus limiting their vehicle throughput.  This two-bay 
configuration greatly restricts vehicle movement within the VIF due to floor space constraints 
and can lead to complete work stoppages if a problem arises when a vehicle is in the single 
transfer isle.  Additionally, the use of vertical integration can be problematic when 
troubleshooting either the booster or payload, as “destacking” the rocket is often needed, which 
entails extensive processing/ pad tie-up times.  This constraint is further exacerbated by the fact 
that Atlas only has two launch pads (one at Cape Canaveral, one at Vandenberg).  Based on 
these constraints, the Atlas EELV portion of the program takes as long as 60 days to process 
and launch a single vehicle, while only meeting a six to 12 launch per year target.   
 Based on these findings, our space launch alternative concentrated on further improving 
the Delta portion of the EELV program, since this would provide a greater return on 
investment based on cost and launch capacity, when compared to Atlas.  This option will 
enable each Delta launch pad to have its own dedicated processing facility in order to decrease 
prelaunch processing time and increase vehicle throughput.  
 
Four Criteria 
a. Responsiveness  
 By building two additional HIFs, adding additional work shifts at each facility, 
and by utilizing plug and play technology, this alternative was able to greatly increase the 
architecture’s overall launch responsiveness to all three user communities (DoD, IC, 
Warfighter) and across all three levels of support (Strategic, Operational, Tactical).  This 
level of responsiveness (7.1 of 9.0) was mainly due to the ability to increase the overall 
launch capacity from 20 per year to potentially 136 launches per year (combined Delta 
and Atlas).  Additionally, responsiveness was further enhanced due to the dramatic 
decrease in pre-launch processing time (from 24 to 12 days) and the ability to store 
launch spares (two) within each HIF if needed.    
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b. Capability  
In terms of capability, this alternative was an improvement to current technology 
(Capability Score: 2.0).  This was based upon the idea that the greatly reduced 
processing time (from 24 to 12 days) would bring about a tremendous improvement in 
the overall launch capacity (from 20 to 136 per year) and thus, provide an overall 
improvement in the architecture.  
 
c. Risk  
Delta has utilized HIFs in the processing of their EELV for over ten years, 
subsequently the TRL for this alternative was deemed to be extremely mature (nine out of 
nine).  Therefore, it received the maximum number of points available (five of five) and 
should, in turn, pose little to no risk in implementation. 
 
d. Cost  
In order to accurately estimate the potential cost of this alternative, historical cost 
data on the original HIF construction was utilized.  Based on reports in “Space Florida”, 
each HIF cost approximately $24 million to build in 1998, for a total cost $48 million 
for the two required facilities.   Additionally, work shift costs were based on 50 workers 
per shift (current manning level) at $100,000 per person per year, for a total cost of $30 
million for six additional work shifts (Cost Score: 5.0, Degree of Certainty: High).  
 Although the construction costs utilized for the architecture were somewhat dated 
and could have been amortized ten years to determine their cost in today’s dollars, this 
level of fidelity was deemed unnecessary.   Because this alternative was one of the least 
expensive within the overall architecture, even adding a 50 percent cost growth would 
have still left it close to the top of the lowest cost reference score.  
 
Possible Setbacks (constraints / restraints) 
The only possible setback associated with this alternative involves possible 
impingement upon the Cape’s wildlife refuge sanctuary.  Because the entire base is located on 
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a wildlife preserve, any new construction project must be fully vetted and approved by wildlife 
officials.  Therefore, it is possible that the construction of two new buildings could run into 
opposition over wildlife impingement concerns.  However, based upon previous construction 
efforts, this possibility is considered unlikely.   
3. Launch On Demand (LOD) Final Alternative 
  SS.LOD.2H: Build-and-launch replacement satellites in weeks for national 
systems and within 72 hours for small satellites such as TACSAT  
 
The final alternative for the Launch on Demand mission area involves drastically 
reducing satellite build/ launch times from years to weeks for national systems, and from 
weeks to 72 hours for small satellites such as TACSAT.  This capability enables the 
architecture to quickly respond to the loss of a national or theater satellite by providing an 
interim stopgap capability until a full replacement satellite could be built and launched.  In 
essence, this alternative would give the architecture a “ready alert” capability to combat 
unanticipated capability losses.  Although this interim stopgap system would likely be less 
capable than its predecessor would, it would still be able to provide some level of capability to 
help mitigate the complete loss in capability of an IMINT, SIGINT, COMMS, etc vehicle 
within a given plane.  In addition to replacement payloads, “ready” boosters would be stored 
within the HIF storage bays to be quickly mated to a given replacement payload as mentioned 
above.  Together, these two options would allow for rapid replenishment (in as little as 72 
hours) of lost assets due to system failure or hostile action.   
The benefits of such a capability would be obvious, especially during open hostilities 
with another nation.  However, in order to implement such a capability, the acquisition process 
would require a paradigm shift in the way spacecraft are currently procured and built.  Instead 
of building satellites as one-of-a-kinds, efficiencies would have to be gained using several 
common bus sizes, along with several common plug-in-play payload types (IMINT, SIGINT, 
COMM, etc).  By moving towards this type of configuration, a given contractor could be put 
on retainer in order to quickly build a replacement satellite in weeks for a national system, vice 
years or even decades, as is currently the case.  This same idea would also apply to smaller 
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satellites of the TACSAT size and variety.  This type of procurement shift would also allow for 
quicker introduction of new technology, since bus and payload sizes would be standardized, 
therefore minimizing research and development time.   
Overall, this alternative will provide the nation with a responsive defense and 
deterrence means for its satellite constellations that it currently does not possess.  By utilizing 
cookie-cutter satellites with plug-and-play technology, the space architecture can greatly 
improve the basic space acquisition process, enable quicker introduction of new technologies 
with much less risk and cost, and enable the replacement of lost assets within weeks and even 
days. 
       
Four Criteria 
a. Responsiveness 
By utilizing common bus types and payloads for both national systems and 
smaller satellites, this alternative was able to greatly enhance the architecture’s overall 
launch on demand responsiveness to all three user communities (DoD, IC, Warfighter) 
and across all three levels of support (Strategic, Operational, Tactical).  This level of 
responsiveness (6.7 of 9.0) was mainly due to the ability to decrease the replacement time 
for a lost vehicle from years to weeks or even days.    
 
b. Capability 
Although at first glance this alternative may seem to be a step in the “less 
capable” direction based upon the discussion in the preceding section, the ability to 
quickly assemble and launch a space vehicle to meet an emerging mission need is truly 
revolutionary (Capability Score: 3.0).  Not only will this capability enable the 
introduction of new sensors and technologies sooner, but also it will also likely serve as a 
strong architecture protection/ deterrence measure for all on-orbit spacecraft. 
Because this alternative will enable the rapid replacement of virtually every 
strategic, operational, and tactical satellite on-orbit, it will demonstrate to potential 




Since most of the technology required to implement this alternative is fairly 
mature (Risk Score: 4.0), it received high marks in this category.  However, three aspects 
of this alternative need improvement in order to meet the desired capability.  The first 
aspect involves the utilization of plug-and-play technology for both the bus and the 
payload.  In order to obtain the flexibility and responsiveness desired, this form of 
integration will be required across the board in order to expedite build times in response to 
an urgent capability need, such as replacing a lost asset. 
The second aspect needing improvement will be a conscious decision to move to 
less complex spacecraft that capitalize on incremental capability improvements, vice 
attempted leaps in technology.  By making all spacecraft less complex (not necessarily 
less capable), industry will be better able to reduce required manufacturing times and in 
turn, increase responsiveness to emerging user needs.  This approach also will help 
mitigate the often-fatal desire to make a single spacecraft do everything, vice limiting the 
number of sensors and missions on a given vehicle.     
The third aspect needing improvement will involve the paradigm shift of building 
satellites in days and weeks, vice in years and decades.  This shift will require a concerted 
effort on both the government and industry’s parts to be successful.  In adopting such an 
initiative, both sides will need to make concessions in terms of cost, schedule, and 
performance.  By accepting incremental improvements in performance, both partners will 
be better able to manipulate costs and schedule in order to achieve the desired 
responsiveness this architecture requires.  
 
d. Cost  
Because this alternative involves a paradigm shift by both the government and the 
space industry, it was determined that implementation costs would be minimal (~$0).  As 
with any procurement contract, the requirement to utilize common bus/ payloads, plug-
and-play technology, and the requirement to provide replacement vehicles in weeks can 
be written into the contract when the Request For Proposal (RFP) goes out to industry.  
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Therefore, programmatic costs should be no more, and in reality less, than those of 
current space systems. (Cost Score: 5.0, Degree of Certainty: High)  
Possible Setbacks (constraints / restraints) 
 Per the discussion above, there are two possible setbacks to this alternative.  The first of 
these is the possibility that plug-and-play technology may not be fully integrated by all 
contractors by the 2025 timeframe.  Although this occurrence is a possibility among some of 
the contractors involved, it seems unlikely that this would be the case for the majority of 
contractors. 
The second and more likely possible setback involves the need for a complete acquisition 
paradigm shift in order to be responsive.  Changing both government and industry to shorten 
the procurement time and to think incrementally vice exponentially will be problematic, if not 
nearly impossible.  This will require a commitment on both sides in order to make such a huge 
shift possible.  However, such efforts have been done successfully before (as exemplified in 
the CORONA and SR-71 programs) and can be done again.  
4. Satellite Operations / Telemetry, Tracking, and Control Final Alternative 
  SS.SO.1, SS.SO.2, SS.SO.3: Single Space Agency   
 
The final alternative for the Satellite Operations / Tracking, Telemetry & Control 
mission area involves folding all of the various space entities (NRO, NGA, JFCC SPACE etc) 
and their associated training, tasking, and mission responsibilities under one overarching space 
agency.  In formulating this alternative, it soon became clear that combining each of the three 
separate alternatives into one, all-encompassing alternative under the guise of a Single Space 
Agency, made logical sense.  Within this construct, three areas would be addressed: Mobile 
Training Teams (MTTs), a National Tasking Board, and a Single Space Agency. 
The first area of the alternative involves standing up and utilizing Mobile Training 
Teams (MTTs) to educate space asset users at all levels on capabilities, product request 
procedures and tools available.  This training would be available to users at all levels 
(Strategic, Operational, and Tactical) and would consist of four “4-man teams” per Combatant 
Commander (COCOM).  This would enable each of the six Combatant Commanders (Southern 
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Command (SOCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), Northern Command (NORTHCOM), 
European Command (EUCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), and Africa Command 
(AFRICOM)) to have four MTTs available to forward deployed users in order to conduct 
training that enables each level of the command structure to capitalize on the space-related 
tools and products available.  In addition, there would also be an option to utilize low- and 
high-bandwidth web-based training linked to each COCOM’s website, but hosted and 
maintained by the Single Space Agency. Together, these two approaches would make for better 
“consumers” and enable the individual users to make space products responsive to them.   
The second area addressed by the alternative involves the establishment of a National 
Technical Means (NTM) Tasking Board to prioritize satellite tasking on a daily and long-term 
basis.  This capability will leverage all of the existing system capabilities through of one 
overarching, jointly manned tasking organization capable of making priority, rapid re-tasking 
decisions for all users.  In order to accomplish this, a Fusion Coordination Cell would be 
established to monitor and assimilate real-time information from NTM and other support 
satellites and use that information to re-task assets as required to support both the Department 
of Defense (DoD) and the Intelligence Community (IC) “on-the-fly”.  By bringing all satellite 
sensor information together within one cell, the ability to form one common operational picture 
can be truly realized.   
The final area addressed by this alternative was the formulation of a single, all 
encompassing Space Agency.  Of all of the alternatives examined within our ORS architecture, 
this alternative was found to be the most important in terms of its responsiveness and its 
capability.  Because of the fractured and often duplicative nature of the current space enterprise 
in the areas of space control, tracking, tasking, training, and acquisition, the formulation of a 
single entity is paramount to making all of the various pieces of the architecture work together 
in a cohesive, responsive manner.  
By forming a Single Space Agency, the architecture will be better able to establish a 
“flatter” organizational structure, enabling decisions to be made quicker and at lower levels.  In 
addition, coordination and tasking will now take place under one umbrella and will result in 
better customer service for all end users.  Additionally, the Space Agency would be comprised 
of both space experts and space acquisition personnel, but also members of each warfare 
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specialty within each military service.  The agency would also be comprised of a large 
contingency of intelligence and interagency personnel representing each of the various space 
stakeholder entities. 
The final necessity for a Single Space Agency is the need for a Joint Space Acquisition 
Office that supports, articulates, and coordinates the needs of all of the services and 
organizations that utilize space. This requirement alone provides a compelling justification for 
such an organization and will provide a great deal of responsiveness to the architecture.  
   
Four Criteria 
a. Responsiveness 
As a three-part alternative, a Single Space Agency increases responsiveness 
through education, quicker decision-making, economies of scale, and a single chain of 
command.  Because there are numerous commands and end users who are ignorant of 
how best to use space to their advantage, i.e. capabilities, product request procedures, and 
tools available, a need exists educate them properly.  By utilizing MTTs, the COCOMs 
will be able to greatly reduce the learning curve resulting in a more efficient and 
responsive use of space assets and products (Responsiveness Score: 6.6).   
A second aspect of this alternative establishes a Fusion Cell to ensure all re-
tasking decisions are made rapidly utilizing one overarching, jointly manned tasking 
organization that reduces coordination requirements and associated response times.  With 
all critical players included within the NTM board, issues can be brought forth 
immediately and acted on quickly (Responsiveness Score: 6.2).  
The third portion of the alternative entails gathering all space entities under one 
command that, by default, will function more quickly than each could separately.  
Additionally, the single space agency will benefit enormously and become more 
responsive from having its own acquisition personnel and its own streamlined space 






Although this alternative is not a “new” idea, we determined that it should still 
receive a 3.0 as a “New Capability” because of the exponential improvement it will bring 
in operations and acquisition.  Therefore, the anticipated gain in effectiveness warrants 
such a score. 
 
c. Risk  
All portions of this alternative, including the formation of MTTs, the creation of a 
joint tasking board, and the consolidation of multiple agencies/ organizations into one 
entity has been done previously (i.e. TRANSCOM, SPACECOM, etc).  Therefore, this 




The total cost of this alternative is approximately $113M with an overall degree 
of certainty (DOC) of “medium”.  For the MTT portion, we determined that four four-
man teams are required per each of the six COCOMS (SOCOM, CENTCOM, 
NORTHCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, and AFRICOM), for a total of 96 personnel.  In order 
to maintain consistency, we assumed a man-year cost of $100K.  That leads us to a 
recurring yearly cost of $9.6M (Cost Score: 5.0, Degree of Certainty: High) to ensure that 
each COCOM maintains 16 MTT personnel each. 
The second part of the alternative refers to the NTM tasking board.  We have 
again assumed $100K per man-year, and the tasking board will require 24/7 manning, 
with three shifts of 10 personnel each.  This portion of the alternative will require 30 
personnel with a yearly cost of approximately $3M (Cost Score: 5.0).  This falls within a 
Medium Degree of Certainty due to the uncertainty surrounding the makeup of the board 
and the amount of tasking requirements per shift.  Therefore, we considered it prudent to 
err on the side of caution and assume 30 personnel 24/7/365.  
The third portion of the alternative carried with it the least accurate cost estimate.  
Due to our limited cost estimation background and a lack of data on combining several 
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organizations into one new parent organization, we were forced to guess on a cost 
estimate and eventually went with $100M (Cost Score: 4.0, Degree of Certainty: Low).  
This estimate may be overly generous and there may be less expense incurred due to cost 
savings from utilizing existing infrastructure. On the other hand, this estimate may also 
grossly underestimate the myriad of costs associated with merging numerous entities. 
Therefore, this estimate should be utilized with great caution. 
 
Possible Setbacks (constraints / restraints)  
As is possible with any large reorganization/consolidation effort, an organizational 
name change and new stationary does not mean that things will naturally be better and more 
efficient.  This alternative requires a paradigm shift from current thinking of “that’s the way 
we’ve always done it” to “this is the way we are going to do it”.  As discussed above, 
numerous advantages can be gained by implementing this alternative. 
Additionally, a task of this magnitude will require significant coordination and 
cooperation from all entities involved in the consolidation/ reorganization effort.  In addition to 
the organizational cooperation involved, Congressional buy-in will also be required in order to 
align the various funding restrictions and agency reporting responsibilities. 
5. Space Support Gaps 
 The final Space Support Alternatives met all requirements except:  
• Alternative launch options for broadened orbit choices and increased launch capacity, 
Inexpensive, efficient, flexible lift vehicles,  
• On-orbit capability to extend satellite service-life and upgrade/change mission 
capabilities, 
• A  “ready-alert” capacity (satellites & boosters) to launch a replacement satellite, of 
each mission type (IMINT, SIGINT, COMM, etc), within 72 hours,  




Alternative launch options was initially formulated to provide more launch options and 
in turn, more launch capacity over the current architecture. Various alternatives, such as Sea 
Launch, Space Ports, and Falcon were examined to determine their possible utility and 
advantage within the new architecture.  However, it soon became apparent that their capability 
and maturity was not going to be significant enough to contribute to an increase in launch 
capacity in the 2025 timeframe.  Additionally, both Sea Launch and the various proposed 
Space Ports were not going to be capable of launching large, national system-type satellites 
into GEO or even LEO orbit.  Therefore, their utility was determined to be limited.  Since the 
number of launches anticipated from the Space Launch alternative, described above, totaled 
136 per year, the need for additional launch options was deemed unnecessary.  Therefore, 
intentionally not meeting this requirement was determined to be an acceptable risk, given the 
fact that the architecture’s launch capacity was fully met with alternative number one. Our 
initial research at the outset of this project, examined inexpensive, efficient, and flexible lift 
vehicles as a possible alternative in the 2025 timeframe.  However, current technology 
estimates indicated that there would be no new or truly revolutionary lift vehicle by the 
required timeframe.  Therefore, this requirement went unmet. 
The group decided that an on-orbit capability was unnecessary, even though this option 
is a unique approach that extends the service life of a given satellite through refueling and 
component upgrades.  After ranking all of the various alternatives (based on responsiveness, 
capability, & technology risk) and examining the utility to the final architecture, a final 
decision was made to exclude it from the architecture.  Based upon these inputs, its exclusion 
was deemed an acceptable risk, since our enhanced launch capacity and improved acquisition 
process would be able to provide all of the mission capability required, and at a much lower 
cost. 
Although the “ready-alert” requirement is unmet, it was determined that this was an 
acceptable risk within the architecture, since our Space Launch alternative will be able to 
provide all of the launch capacity (in a somewhat affordable manner) required in 2025.  The 
use of the current EELV program is able to meet both the weight and capacity requirements of 
our ORS architecture.  However, we recommend that commercial companies and DoD 
continue to research and pursue such technologies for possible use in the future.  This 
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requirement was initially thought to be a critical component of the responsive Space Support 
Mission Area and more specifically, responsive Launch On Demand.  However, as other 
alternatives were formulated, it became apparent that the $4 billion dollar price tag associated 
with this alternative made it prohibitive.  Additionally, two factors enabled the exclusion of 
this alternative to be an acceptable risk.  The first factor was the rapid response time associated 
with the Launch on Demand alternative discussed previously.  By partially mitigating the loss 
of a national system within 72 hours, this capability greatly decreased the need for a $4 billion 
dollar “ready alert” capability.  The second factor that weighed heavily in the decision to forgo 
this requirement was the strong political and budgetary argument against storing billion dollar 
satellites in a warehouse until needed.  In an era of ever-shrinking defense budgets, it is 
unlikely that this rationale could have been sold to either the government or the taxpayers.  
Therefore, it was determined that the requirement was unwarranted. 
The requirement for cross communication was met under several mission areas outside 
of Space Support and therefore not covered under our alternatives with no induced risk. 
 
B. FORCE APPLICATION  
1. Definition  
 The application of force would consist of attacks against terrestrial-based targets carried 
out by military weapons systems operating in or through space. The force application mission 
area includes ballistic missile defense and force projection. 
2. Transport Final Alternative 
 FA.5: Hypersonic delivery vehicle 
 
The ability to deliver personnel, logistics, or weapons to any location in the world in 
less than two hours would provide the United States a great advantage over any potential 
adversary.  Having this capability may deter potential adversaries since they know any 
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negative action on their part could lead to a quick retaliation from the United States.  It would 
provide a forward presence without forward deployment of forces.  
In the non-combative arena, a hypersonic suborbital vehicle help deliver supplies to 
areas devastated by a natural disaster.  It could also be used to resupply United Nations forces 
in remote areas.  It was determined six vehicles could cover a majority of 
theaters/contingencies depending on re-usability.  They would be launched using current 
launch technology (Atlas and Delta rockets) from exiting launch sites in CONUS to anywhere 
world wide.  
The team decided to keep based on numerous other-than-military applications this 
capability would provide: Humanitarian assistance to inaccessible disaster areas, replacement 
for ICBM’s, rapid reaction force / rapid reinforcement capability, SOF insertion in denied 
access regions, Operational Maneuver from the States (OMFTS), etc. 
 
Four Criteria 
a. Responsiveness  
The hypersonic suborbital vehicle received a score of 5.7 for responsiveness 
because it does not address any Intelligence Community needs. 
 
b. Capability 
 Since a hypersonic vehicle would be a new capability that the United States does 
not currently posses, it received a capability score of 3.0. 
 
c. Risk 
 Much of the technology required to build a hypersonic suborbital vehicle does 
not exist yet.  This immaturity of technology led to the vehicle receiving a technology 




The lack of current technology to build a hypersonic suborbital vehicle requires a 
larger amount of research and development funding.  This large research and 
development effort led to a cost score of 2.0.   The cost associated with the vehicle has a 
low degree of certainty  and was based on the SpaceShip One endeavor. 
 
Possible Setbacks (constraints / restraints) 
One of the biggest restraints the hypersonic suborbital transport vehicle will face is the 
enormous amount of resources it will take to develop, build, and field the vehicle.  In a 
government that is stretched thin on money, attempting to divert a larger portion of the budget 
to development of the hypersonic suborbital vehicle will face an uphill battle.  In order to fund 
the vehicle, funding from other programs will have to be used, which means another 
government funding program will be impacted.  The hypersonic vehicle may not have enough 
priority to receive the additional funding or other program funding required to proceed with its 
development. 
The hypersonic vehicle will not address the intelligence community.  It primarily assists 
DOD strategic, operational, and tactical customers along with the warfighter at each of those 
levels in their persecution of small contingencies and humanitarian operations.  The 
intelligence would have little use of a hypersonic vehicle. 
One of the biggest constraints right now is the technology needed to build and fly a 
hypersonic vehicle.   Hypersonic engines are all but undeveloped.  There are a few commercial 
ventures taking place that researching these engines, but they are costly and unless there is a 
commercial market for such engines the time and cost to build them may hinder their 
development.  Also, very little research has been performed to attempt to make the ballistic re-
entry ride compatible with human physiology.  Being capable of delivering a squad of 
warfighters to a contingency area in less than two hours does no one any good if those 
warfighters are unable to fight once they disembark the vehicle.  
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Another issue with the use of a hypersonic suborbital vehicle would be vehicle 
recovery.  Since the vehicle would be launched via an Atlas of Delta rocket from the U.S., the 
question arises as to how the vehicle could be brought back to the U.S. and reused.  Along the 
same lines would be the question of how the troops that were inserted into the area would be 
retrieved once the mission was over. 
3. Space Weapons Final Alternative 
 FA.3, FA.4: Permanent and Non-permanent effects space based weapons 
 
Although there are many reasons to not develop and place weapons in space, mainly 
existing conventions that space is neutral territory, analyzing this alternative purely from a 
military capability point of view lead the group to believe that now is the time to begin taking 
advantage of the strategic and tactical “high ground” space provides.   
For the purposes of this study the weapons systems discussed would be space based 
with effects against terrestrial targets.  The weapons would be tasked in a similar manner to the 
current Joint Targeting Process and would provide the commander another weapon to integrate 
into a combined arms style of warfare.  
 
Four Criteria 
a. Responsiveness  
Although this alternative was seldom ranked as responsive to any of the 
Intelligence Community it was viewed as greatly increasing the responsiveness of space 
to both the strategic DoD user and the operational and tactical Warfighter.  






The capability to deliver weapon effects terrestrially from a space based asset is a 
completely new capability (Capability Score: 3.0 and 3.0) 
 
c. Risk 
The technology readiness levels of the mix of permanent and non-permanent 
effects weapons varied based on which technology was examined.  In general, the 
technology required has already been tested in one form or another but has yet to be 
tested from space. (Risk Score: 3.0 and 5.0) 
 
d. Cost 
The cost for both permanent and non-permanent effects weapons systems were 
both assessed with a Medium Degree of Certainty, based on the fact that both 
technologies have not yet been fully developed so O&M costs could only be estimated.  
A total cost for the architecture required would be approximately $7.9B (Cost Score: 2.0 
and 2.0). 
 
Possible Setbacks (constraints / restraints) 
 The main constraints this alternative would have to deal with include finite resources 
both in both budget and political will.  The weaponization of space would require the United 
States to divert a large portion of funding for conventional weapons.  It would also require the 
U.S. to withdraw from or re-negotiate several existing treaties on the topic of the 
weaponization of space. 
 The main restraints involve the physics surrounding the operating procedures of 
delivering both permanent and non-permanent weapons from space as well as the current 
technological readiness level of such a capability. 
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4. Force Application Gaps 
The final Force Application Alternatives met all requirements except: 
• Relationships with commercial space port entities. 
• Develop Joint Doctrine for Fires 
 
Both gaps were deemed to be acceptable because implementation of the Space Support 
alternative to increase efficiencies in current launch infrastructure, and any commercial 
capability would not required.   
Also, implementation of the Space Support alternative to re-organize the National 
Security Space Enterprise will establish proper authority and appropriate body to develop 
doctrine regarding space based terrestrial effects fires. 
. 
C. FORCE ENHANCEMENT  
1. Definition  
Force enhancement operations multiply joint force effectiveness by enhancing 
battlespace awareness and providing needed warfighter support.  There are five force 
enhancement functions: integrated tactical warning and attack assessment, environmental 
monitoring, communications, and position, velocity, time, and navigation.  They provide 
significant advantage by reducing confusion inherent in combat situations.  They also improve 
the lethality of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces (JP 3-14, IV-8).  One 
alternative is included for each of the five force enhancement functions.  Two additional force 
enhancement alternatives were also included in our architecture: complete integration with 
terrestrial systems and tactical communications and imaging.   
2. Indications, Tracking, Warning, and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) Final 
Alternative 
 FE.IA.2: Create Joint Ventures with Other Countries 
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Creating joint ventures with other countries was chosen as the best ITW/AA alternative.  
As a whole, this sub-mission area is currently viewed as being responsive.  Keeping this in 
mind the goal with this alternative was to find a way to continue executing this mission while 
making the entire architecture more responsive.  This can be accomplished by working with 
our allies to perform ITW/AA.  By combining our efforts with others we can perform this 
mission with less manpower and resources.    
 
Four Criteria 
a. Responsiveness  
A multi-party ITW/AA system will be more responsive.  When more countries 
are devoting resources to this mission there will be more resources available for use.  
This could translate into more assets providing increased coverage to more users or into 
increased capabilities (Responsive Score: 5.5) 
 
b. Capability 
There will be an improvement in the capabilities associated with this alternative.  
These improvements will stem from the additional resources being devoted to ITW/AA.  
The same rational that makes this alternative more responsive also makes it more capable 
(Capability Score: 2.0). 
 
c. Risk 
This alternative does not rely on any new or experimental technology.  It will 
continue to use proven technologies and equipment currently in use today.  For these 






The cost estimate for this alternative is $5.5 million (Cost Score: 3.0).  This uses a 
conservative estimate that we would spend half as much on this sub-mission area when 
partnered with allied countries (this percentage depends heavily on the number of partner 
countries).  This percentage was then applied to the total spent on ITW/AA in the FY08 
National Security Space Budget.  Due to this method of estimation the degree of certainty 
for this estimate is low. 
 
Possible Setbacks (constraints / restraints) 
The biggest constraint for a combined approach to ITW/AA will be political views.  
Convincing members of our government along with our allies that this approach will benefit all 
parties involved could be difficult.  Additionally, multi-national ventures can become very 
complex and complicated.  Coordination in such an arrangement can be constraining. 
3. Environmental Monitoring (EM) Final Alternative 
 FE.E.2: Create Joint Ventures with Other Countries 
 
Creating joint ventures with other countries to share costs and resources was chosen as 
the best EM alternative.  Here again, as with the ITW/AA alternative it was seen as the most 
sensible choice to work with our allies to meet this need.  It’s intuitively obvious to surmise 
that by combining assets and resources with our global partners that a better product can be 
produced more quickly and at a lower cost.  This alternative also uniquely affords the approach 
of international non-military interest due to its overall inherent nature of being of great public 
interest.  Although the data produced may certainly have military applicability in addition to 
the vast civilian uses, the technology used isn’t so encumbered by the necessity for military 






The joint venture approach to EM will yield more responsive results.  It’s 
straightforward to see that with increased participation there will come numerous places 
where there exists the commitment to provide a needed product.  This multi-national 
interest will provide the varied and wide interest needed to expedite the necessary R&D 
and expedite product development, which will, in turn, provide increased responsiveness 
when compared to a unilateral approach (Responsiveness Score: 6.1).  
 
b. Capability 
This alternative will also provide an increased level of capability (Capability 
Score: 2.0).  This increase in capability will primarily come from the increase in 
resources available.  The greater the resources devoted to this alternative the more likely 
it is that there will be an increase in capabilities.  Capabilities may also be increased due 
to the likely increase in coverage areas due to the international participation and their 
unique, individual requirements.  
 
c. Risk 
This alternative will not require any new or experimental technology.  This 
alternative’s strength is based on its teaming efforts and not on its innovative technology.  
The technology risk will be minimal (Risk Score: 5.0) 
 
d. Cost 
The cost estimate for this alternative is roughly $230 million (Cost Score: 4.0).  
This uses a conservative estimate that we would spend half as much on this sub-mission 
area when partnered with allied countries (this percentage depends heavily on the number 
of partner countries).  This fraction was then applied to the total spent on EM in the FY08 
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National Security Space Budget.  Due to this method of estimation the degree of certainty 
for this estimate is low. 
 The individual participant cost for EM will also go down as a result of cost 
sharing. Each nation will not be uniquely and redundantly providing the funds necessary 
to provide a capability at a higher rate of responsiveness.  Nations will not be paying 
alone for the R&D and product development of the same basic capability that some other 
nation has already paid for.  The overall cost will be shared and the R&D and 
development costs will be a one-time thing instead of numerous times as in an individual 
nation approach. 
 
Possible Setbacks (constraints / restraints) 
Here again, as in the previous alternative, political views and goals of various 
governments could oftentimes be at odds with each other.  It will take a concerted effort on all 
stakeholders’ parts to genuinely work through disagreements so that the overall mission is 
successful.  Also, with the increase in participation from numerous countries the coordination 
can become very complicated very fast.   
4. Complete Integration with Terrestrial Systems Final Alternative 
 FE.CI.1: Expand Functionality of Current Information Systems to Include Cross 
System Sharing 
 
The most advanced space architecture in the world would be useless if there was no 
way to move information from one location to another.  This is why we created an important 
place in our architecture for system integration on the ground.  A responsive architecture must 
contain the ability to quickly and easily transmit information on based on user demand.  A key 
to responsiveness is the right information at the right place at the right time.  Considering the 
current state of our space enterprise the best way to achieve this is to expand the functionality 
of current space related information systems to allow for cross system information sharing.  
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This could be accomplished by implementing compatible data formats, an accepted 
communication protocol, and mutual policies for access 
 
Four Criteria 
a. Responsiveness  
Information flow is critical to a responsive architecture.  An integrated system 
with information on demand will create a more responsive architecture for all users.  This 
alternative will create a distributed data warehouse that facilitates information sharing on 
a scale never before seen by our space agencies (Responsiveness Score: 7.3). 
 
b. Capability 
An integrated information system will definitely bring improved capabilities to 
the overall architecture.  Individuals and agencies that would never dream of sharing 
information with today’s architecture could access each other’s data just as easily as they 
check their email (Capability Score: 2.0). 
 
c. Risk 
This alternative carries a moderate technology risk (Risk Score: 3.0).  The 
concepts and technologies have been proven and are in use today, but not on this large of 
a scale with this type of sensitive information.  Even with compatible data formats and 
accepted communication protocols potential difficulties may exist with adapting existing 
systems to meet these new standards. 
 
d. Cost 
This integrated information system is estimated to cost $1.2 billon (Cost Score: 
3.0).  This is based on an information systems rule of thumb that on average an 
organization spends 15% of their annual budget on building and maintaining their 
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information systems.  The FY08 National Security Space Budget was used as our 
architecture’s total budget.  This estimate has a low degree of certainty. 
 
Possible Setbacks (constraints / restraints) 
The biggest constraints that this alternative faces are the access policies for the 
individual agencies within our space architecture.  Some organizations are extremely particular 
about how their information can be access and by whom.  Getting past these information 
stovepipes will a difficult but very worthwhile task. 
5. Communications Final Alternative 
 FE.C.3: Leverage the Commercial Market by Deploying Hosted Payloads on 
Future Launches 
 
Reliable communication is a requirement for any responsive architecture.  The 
communications alternative included in this architecture is to leverage the commercial market 
by deploying hosted payloads on private launches.  Military communications payloads would 
be placed on commercial satellites, essentially leasing space on these satellites.  In times of low 
utilization we could sell bandwidth to commercial users. 
 
Four Criteria 
a. Responsiveness  
 This alternative will add responsiveness to the current communications 
architecture (Responsiveness Score: 6.5).  By only focusing on the payloads we will 
eliminate the need to devote resources to bus development for communications satellites.  
This frees up resources to work on designing and build better, more responsive, payloads.  
Additional resource could also mean more communications payloads on orbit providing 
responsive communications to more users. 
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b. Capability 
Although this alternative does not set out to produce a new capability, it will 
provide improved capabilities to its users (Capability Score: 2.0).  The factors that make 




This alternative involves low technology risks because it does not rely on new or 
unproven technology (Risk Score: 5.0).  It’s focus it on how we get our communications 




Space Mission Analysis and Design states that approximately 40% of a 
communications satellite cost is spent on its payload (SMAD, 799).  By applying this 
percentage to the communications portion of the FY08 National Security Space Budget 
resulted in an estimated cost of $1.2 billion (Cost Score: 3.0).  This method of estimation 
yields a lows degree of certainty.   
   
Possible Setbacks (constraints / restraints) 
This alternative will be constrained to the launch schedules of commercial satellite 
manufactures.  Any difficulties or delays they encounter will affect our payloads.  Our 
communications payloads will also be restrained once they are on orbit.  Since we are leasing 
space on a bus we will not have tactical control of these satellites.    
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6. Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Final Alternative 
 FE.P.3: Implement Inertial Navigation System (INS) Capabilities to operate until 
GPS signal re-established  
 
This alternative was chosen as the best PNT alternative.  INS technologies are already 
being widely used in smart bombs.  There’s a lot of work currently being done in industry 
using INS and Non-Inertial Sensors (NIS) technologies to try to help first responders such as 
firemen and policemen to locate individual responders within buildings. The idea here is to try 
to increase that capability to other non-weapon items to support continuous navigation 
(although degraded) in the absence of a reliable GPS signal.   
Four Criteria 
a. Responsiveness  
Implementation of INS Capabilities will yield PNT responsiveness to our forces 
(Responsiveness Score: 5.4).  The insertion of Inertial Measurement Units (IMU) and 
Micro Electrical-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) on both personnel and vehicle equipment 
will yield almost an immediate increase in both position and navigation capabilities.  
These position and navigation capabilities will be at a degraded quality to that provided 
by an un-impeded GPS signal.   
 
b. Capability 
This alternative will provide an increased capability in the position and navigation 
area (Capability Score: 2.0).  This alternative provides this through a redundant (although 
degraded) capability for both position and navigation during times of denied access to a 
reliable GPS signal.  This alternative will also provide enhanced Situational Awareness 





The technology risk is minimal (Risk Score: 5.0).  There is nothing new or 
revolutionary involved.  This technology already exists. 
 
d. Cost 
The cost to implement this alternative has a medium-level degree of certainty and 
is ranked in the 2nd highest level of cost for proposed alternatives.  The estimate for cost 
was based using 2 million DoD personnel out of 2,923,966 total personnel (FY2004), 
which includes roughly 680,000 civilians.  Also, assuming that this equipment will be put 
on 500,000 various kinds of vehicles (aircraft, ships, tanks, HMMWVs, etc).  Using this 
information along with an an approximate cost of $1200 for each IMU or MEMS on 2.5 
million personnel and equipment gives an approximate cost of $3 billion.  Assuming a 
20% overhead for maintenance, replacement, and upgrades on a yearly basis would mean 
that there would need to be $600 million/year.  For a total of $3.6 billion (Cost Score: 
2.0) 
 
Possible Setbacks (constraints / restraints) 
A possible constraint to implementing this alternative is the relatively high initial 
investment of purchasing the necessary devices for all personnel and equipment.  This initial 
shock may be somewhat alleviated by purchasing over a time period of 5 – 10 years based on a 
priority of fielding scenario.  This would dramatically decrease the initial yearly investment.  
Another option may be to decide to take on some operational risk and decide to field this 
capability only to specific units and/or personnel instead of the entire force. 
The other drawback to this option is that it’s not exciting…there’s nothing new here.  It’s not a 
brand-new fancy gizmo that everyone hasn’t heard of.  It’s just implementing technology we 
already have to increase/provide additional and redundant position and navigation capability.  
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7. Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) Final Alternative 
 FE.I.3: Add a Secondary Payload to Each Iridium “Next” Satellite to Provide 
Persistent Global Electro-Optical Coverage 
 
Add a secondary payload to each Iridium NEXT satellite to provide persistent global 
EO coverage is the best ISR alternative.  Iridium is the only company in the world operating a 
LEO constellation of 66 satellites with global persistence.  Their original constellation is due to 
be upgraded.  Currently, Iridium is looking for partners with an interest in adding secondary 
payloads to the Iridium NEXT constellation. This narrow window of opportunity allows us to 
add a persistent imagery capability globally without the Department of Defense assuming total 
responsibility of launching, operating, or maintaining the entire constellation. 
 
Four Criteria 
a. Responsiveness  
This alternative is highly responsive as it would allow us to image any place in 
the world ‘on-demand.’ (Responsiveness Score: 6.9) 
 
b. Capability 
This is a new capability (Capability Score: 3.0).  We have never had global 
imagery persistence.  This capability would benefit tactical and strategic users alike.  This 
would enable tactical users to get the latest imagery before an operation.  This alternative 
would also allow strategic users to monitor a critical target until a national system is 






This is seen as a low risk/high TRL alternative (Risk Score: 4.0).  Similar 
payloads to this alternative have been produced in the past with good results. 
 
d. Cost 
The one time engineering cost for a 50kg imagery payload capable of providing 
sub-meter GSD from a 700km altitude is $20M (TACSAT 2 imagery payload bids were 
for $10M from 410km alt).  The cost for building 66 payloads at $2M each would be 
$132M.  The estimated Iridium fee for adding secondary payloads to their satellites 
would be $4.5M each for a total of $297M.  The cost for engineering and building a 
system for tasking, operating, and maintaining the payloads would be $51M for a total of 
$500M (Cost Score: 3, Degree of Certainty: Low). 
 
Possible Setbacks (constraints / restraints) 
The only technical problem associated with this alternative might be the lack of a 
robust slewing and pointing capability on the Iridium communications satellite to support the 
imagery secondary payload.  
8. Tactical Communications & Imaging Final Alternative 
 FE.C.4, FE.I.5: Invest in and deploy high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) 
airships capable of providing persistent imagery and communications to warfighters in a 
theater of operations.  
 
This alternative is a hybrid alternative added to meet the growing need of battlefield 
commanders for increased imagery and communications support.  By using high-altitude 
platforms to responsively fill the majority of warfighter needs in a given theater of operations, 
national assets can resume the role for which they were originally intended – strategic 
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intelligence gathering and long-range communications.  This would allow these national assets 
to be more responsive to strategic national customers. 
Currently, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) is sponsoring an 
Advance Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) of High Altitude Airship (HAA) 
developed by Lockheed-Martin.  Airships such as this offer pseudo geostationary satellite like 
capabilities.  They can act as persistent imagery platforms and communications relays.  At an 
operating altitude of 65,000 feet, they would have a 630 mile wide footprint.  
 
Four Criteria 
a. Responsiveness  
HALE airships offer excellent responsiveness by delivering high resolution ‘on-
demand’ imagery and/or video from anywhere inside it 630 mile footprint 
(Responsiveness Score: 6.2 and 6.2).  Additionally, airships can provide a platform for 
high bandwidth communications relay that can provide regional support for Army 
Warfighter Information Network – Tactical (WIN-T) and the Future Combat System 




This is a new capability (Capability Score: 3.0 and 3.0).  Airships of this size have 
not been constructed for decades and never unmanned and at such a high altitude.  The 
payload goals are for 4,000lbs to 65,000 ft, 10 kW of power, capable of remaining on 
station for one year. 
 
c. Risk 
The key technologies required to build a HAA prototype are now available and 
tested – awaiting funding to proceed (Risk Score: 3.0 and 3.0). 
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d. Cost 
Costs include $150M for R&D, the initial six airship for $300M ($50M goal per 
airship), and approximately $100M for ground infrastructure and operation and 
maintenance of the airship fleet (Cost Score: 3.0 and 4.0, Degree of Certainty: High and 
Medium).  
 
Possible Setbacks (constraints / restraints) 
The main setback is funding.  The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) recently cut 
funding and transferred the program to SMDC.  SMDC is trying to sustain the program.  A 
prototype can be built and flight tested in 3 years depending on the funding profile. 
9. Force Enhancement Gaps 
The final Force Enhancement Alternatives met all requirements except: 
• Improved PNT anti-jam/jam detection capabilities 
• Augment Current Architecture with GPS Block III enhancements   
 
We felt that not having the improved PNT anti-jam/jam detection capability was an 
acceptable risk.  Jamming risk will be mitigated by enhanced Inertial Navigation capabilities in 
the absence of a guidance signal.  If jamming does occur the mission will be able to be 
continued with a degraded capability until the jamming can be eliminated and a reliable GPS 
signal be re-obtained.   
We also felt that not having the alternative of augmenting current Architecture with 
GPS Block III enhancements was an acceptable risk.  This risk was assumed acceptable from 
our vantage point of ORS.  We realize that not having some type of GPS satellite system is 
totally unacceptable in the foreseeable future.  We made the assumption that since the GPS 
Block III initial contract has already been awarded that this required capability will be seen to 
completion. 
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D. SPACE CONTROL  
1. Definition  
Space control operations provide freedom of action in space for friendly forces while, 
when directed, denying it to an adversary, and include the broad aspect of protection of US and 
US allied space systems and negation of enemy adversary space systems. Space control 
operations encompass all elements of the space defense mission and include offensive and 
defensive operations by friendly forces to gain and maintain space superiority and situational 
awareness if events impact space operations. 
2. Protection Final Alternative 
  SC.P.1, SC.P.7: Develop Protection Capabilities Across the Entire EM Spectrum 
for All National Space Assets. 
 
The final space control, protection alternative was “Develop protection capability 
through entire EM spectrum for all national assets.”  This was a hybrid of two previous 
alternatives. The first alternative stated, “Develop filters to protect optical/IR focal planes.” 
The second alternative was “Enhance anti-jam capabilities.” It was decided that these two 
alternatives were similar enough in their intent that they could be combined to achieve a 
greater level of responsiveness for our architecture. The desired end state for the protection 
aspect of space control is to ensure that our space assets have the ability to function as they 
were designed in order to provide the user information when it is needed. 
To develop a protection capability through the EM spectrum future satellites must be 
designed with enemy capabilities in mind. Jamming and dazzling are two easy ways in which 
our enemy can deny the use of our space assets. Current capabilities such as filters, shutters, 
spot-beams, frequency hoping, and increased payload power exist to combat these enemy 
tactics. By ensuring that we equip all future national assets with these countermeasures we can 




a. Responsiveness  
We felt that developing a protection capability through the entire EM spectrum 
was extremely important when considering developing an architecture that is responsive . 
How could you possibly be responsive from space if your enemy is denying the use of 
your space assets? To achieve greater responsiveness we decided to implement existing 
technologies on all future national space assets. The use of filters and shutters on optical 
and IR platforms can ensure that our enemy’s ability to blind these assets is reduced. 
Responsiveness can also be maintained through the use of frequency hopping and spot-
beams on all our national assets to prevent the effects of jamming. Increased power on 
satellites, such as the GPS III constellation, will prevent our enemy the ability to jam our 
receivers without alerting us to the location from which they are jamming 
(Responsiveness Score: 7.4 and 6.7).  
 
b. Capability 
The overall capability of our architecture will be increased if these changes are 
implemented. By making it more difficult for our enemy to deny our use of space we are, 
by default, increasing our capability (Capability Score: 1.0 and 1.0). 
 
c. Risk 
Technology risk to implement these changes to future national space assets was 
small. All the changes that we are proposing exist in one form or another. The only risk 
involved is incorporating them all into one payload (Risk Score: 4.0 and 5.0). 
 
d. Cost 
The cost of implementing these additions to future payloads was based on 
research into existing technologies. Commercial vendors for optical filters were 
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researched.  We based our estimates on prices for UV, Visible, and Near IR band pass 
filters available from the Andover Corporation of Salem, NH. Research into AEHF and 
GPS III was analyzed because they included similar capabilities (frequency hopping, 
spot-beams and increased power) as the changes we are suggesting for all future 
satellites. The cost for these technologies was taken from articles about the corporations 
that won the contracts for GPS III and AEHF. A medium degree of certainty for the cost 
of this alternative was given because we obtained actual prices from vendors for the 
filters. We found cost information from the contracts for AEHF and GPS III. Given their 
similar capabilities to the suggestions we had for implementation in the future, we used 
their cost information as a base for our cost estimate. We feel that this assessment could 
be argued to be a low degree of certainty given the high cost of this alternative 
(Approximately $14 Billion) for relatively simple technology (Cost Score: 1.0 and 5.0, 
Degree of Certainty: Medium and Medium). 
 
Possible Setbacks (constraints / restraints) 
The only possible setback for this alternative that we identified was the cost. 
Approximately $14 Billion dollars to equip all our future satellites with existing means to 
protect our capability throughout the entire electromagnetic spectrum. We did estimate the cost 
to be a medium degree of certainty, but again it could be argued that this estimate is high and 
we could have given our estimate a low degree of certainly. Either way, cost was our only 
hurdle to implementing this alternative. 
3. Negation Final Alternative 
 SC.N.3: Develop Terrestrial Based Counter-ASAT System 
 
This alternative includes developing kinetic as well as directed energy weapons to 
protect our space assets. We looked at employing these weapons from land, sea and air 
platforms. 
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Four Criteria 
a. Responsiveness  
The development of a counter ASAT system allows our entire architecture to 
maintain responsiveness (Responsiveness Score: 6.5). If a hostile country or non-state 
actor were able to shoot down our satellites we would lose the capabilities provided by 
those assets. Such actions would yield the United States less responsive and threaten the 
ability of the US to carry out some missions. 
 
b. Capability 
We assessed the alternative of a terrestrial based counter ASAT system as an 
improved capability (Capability Score: 2.0). We currently have much of the technology 
to make this alternative a reality. It would provide the US with greater capability in our 
quest to protect of national systems. 
 
c. Risk 
Our technology risk score was low because we have demonstrated the ability to 
destroy missiles in flight with programs such as the BMD program (Risk Score: 5.0). We 
have options within this alternative that have the ability to destroy an ASAT in it boost 
phase as demonstrated by the airborne laser and airborne interceptors. The development 
of the kinetic energy interceptor by the MDA for use by land and sea components is the 
biggest hurdle to procuring a successful terrestrial counter ASAT system. 
 
d. Cost 
Cost for this alternative was estimated using a 2007 study from the Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). The CSBA is an independent, non-
partisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate 
about national security strategy and investment options. The cost estimates that the 
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CSBA provided were for a twenty-year period and given on 2007 dollars. The CSBA 
looked at several options to achieve counter ASAT capabilities. The options included 
airborne interceptors, airborne laser interceptors, ground-based interceptors and sea based 
interceptors. 
The airborne interceptor option would be able to intercept an ASAT in the boost 
phase. The boost phase is the part of the missile flight path from launch until it stops 
accelerating under its own power. It typically ends within the first 3-5 minutes of flight. 
Seven hundred kinetic-energy interceptors would be carried aboard aircraft with the 
ability to cover three defended areas, over North Korea or Iran, 24 hours a day. This 
alterative would cost approximately $1.3 Billion per year. 
The airborne laser option would consist of seven modified 747 aircraft. Each 
would be equipped with a Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser (COIL) laser. The COIL laser 
has the ability to disable an ASAT in the boost phase. It attacks at the speed of light at a 
range of hundreds of kilometers. This alterative would cost approximately $800 Million 
per year. 
 The ground based system option would consist of 100 platforms. The Missile 
Defense Agency is currently developing Kinetic Energy interceptors capable of 
intercepting ASAT in the boost phase with land-mobile platforms. This alterative would 
cost approximately $2.2 Billion per year. 
The sea based interceptor option would consist of 9 Aegis destroyers armed with 
35 missile interceptors each. Currently, Aegis destroyers are armed with SM 3 missiles 
that have the ability to shoot down ballistic missiles in the midcourse range. The Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA) is working with the navy to introduce kinetic energy 
interceptors that can be used to strike missiles in the boost phase of flight. This alterative 
would cost approximately $4.3 Billion per year (Cost Score: 2.0, Degree of Certainty: 
High / Medium). 
We arrived at our cost estimate by looking at the costs provided by the CSBA. 
The CSBA had estimates based over 20 years. We took those cost numbers, adjusted for 
inflation and divided them by 20 to give us an estimate for one year. Since each of the 
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options provides us with the same capability we choose the most expensive option being 
the sea-based option costing approximately $4.25 billion per year. This represented the 
worst case for this alternative. Choosing the worst case would also allow us to consider a 
hybrid of the other counter ASAT alternatives that were less expensive. We gave the cost 
for this alternative a medium degree of certainty because of the cost information provided 
by the CSBA. We felt that we could not give the alternative a high degree of certainty 
because the kinetic energy interceptor is not yet available for the ground and sea aspects 
of this alternative.  
 
Possible Setbacks (constraints / restraints) 
The physics behind a counter ASAT system are quite challenging. For a terrestrial 
based counter ASAT system to be successful, we must have assets in theater. If we do not have 
assets in theater the distance needed for the interceptor to reach its target will be too great 
given the time it takes to shot down a satellite. This can especially be an issue if a country with 
a large land mass launches an ASAT from an area where we have little access.  
Another possible setback is our ability to identify and engage multiple ASAT’s 
launched from a single site. The MDA is currently developing mobile high resolution, X-band 
class phased array radars with the ability to acquire, track, discriminate, classify, identify and 
estimate trajectory parameters and pass the information to fire control radars. Quick and 
accurate identification of ASAT is imperative if we are to successfully engage multiple 
ASAT’s.  
The ability to intercept missiles in their boost phase can also be a setback. The 
successful development of the kinetic energy interceptor for land and sea based platforms is 
essential for the US to have a successful counter ASAT capability. 
4. Surveillance Final Alternative 
 SC.S.3: Add more Electro-Optical and Radar Sensors Worldwide to Minimize 




a. Responsiveness  
Increasing the number of terrestrial based telescopes and radar systems in the 
current Space Surveillance Network (SSN) will improve responsiveness of our space 
architecture (Responsiveness Score: 5.8).  The gains in responsiveness come from the 
reduction in the number of gaps in coverage and more timely updates on satellite 
activities.  As more countries gain access to space, space real estate will become more 
congested. The expanded access and coverage will facilitate fusing space surveillance 
data into a more complete common operating picture.   
 
b. Capability 
Terrestrial based space surveillance is an existing capability (Capability: 1.0). 
However, increasing the number of observation post available will improve that 
capability have benefit for the entire architecture. 
 
c. Risk 
The technology risk associated with expanding the SSN is minimal (Risk Score: 
5.0).  The proposed additions are based on current technology that already exists within 
the surveillance network and will be easy to integrate into the existing infrastructure. 
 
d. Cost 
The cost estimate for expansion of the SSN was derived from a 2002 estimate for 
overhauling the Naval Space Surveillance System.  In October 2002, Raytheon Integrated 
Defense Systems was awarded a $396 Million dollar contract to complete repairs on the 
network’s nine field stations and dramatically improve its performance.  The cost per 
sensor amounts to $44 Million dollars.  For simplicity, we assumed that the cost of an 
optical sensor and the cost for a radar sensor would be the same.  Given that there are 
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currently 28 sensors in the SSN network we could increase the number of sensors on the 
ground by 36 percent (10 sensors- 5 optical and 5 radar) at a total cost of $440 Million 
(Cost Score: 4.0, Degree of Certainty: High). 
 
Possible Setbacks (constraints / restraints) 
There are no foreseeable setbacks to implementing this alternative. 
5. Prevention Final Alternative 
 SC.PV.1, SC.PV.2, SS.SO.4: Shift to cross-links on all future satellites.   
This alternative was the result of merging two similar alternatives into a single hybrid 
that would better serve communications within the architecture.  The hybrid alternative merged 
laser and radio frequency cross-links together. 
 
Four Criteria 
a. Responsiveness  
Unlike the traditional “bent pipe” links, a satellite architecture fully integrated 
with cross-links could provide alternate paths for communications via satellite-to-satellite 
relays.  These relays may be propagated through multiple radio frequency (RF) or laser 
cross-links (Responsiveness Score: 7.0 and 6.2 and 6.7).    
 
b. Capability 
While cross-linking technology is an existing capability, implementing this 
alternative will provide more flexibility in satellite communications (Capability Score; 
2.0 and 2.0 and 3.0).  This added flexibility to redirect communications paths via cross-
links will result in a more capable architecture.  Capability will also be dramatically 




The technology risk for implementing either laser or RF cross-links is low.  The 
technology is quite mature and is currently in use on some satellite systems (Risk Score: 
5.0 and 5.0 and 3.0). 
 
d. Cost 
The Union of Concerned Scientists’ Satellite Database was used to help complete 
the cost estimate for this alternative.  After querying the database, we were able to 
determine that 250 satellites are currently being used to service the communications 
requirements for government and military applications.  Our estimate was based on 
replacing each of these satellites with new ones containing cross-links.  Based on a cost 
of $600 thousand per copy for one laser transmitter, the cost of implementing this 
alternative amounts to $150 million dollars (Cost Score: 4.0 and 4.0 and 4.0, Degree of 
Certainty: Medium and Low and Low).   
 
Possible Setbacks (constraints / restraints) 
There are no foreseeable setbacks to implementing this alternative. 
6. Space Control Gaps 
We identified three space control gaps from the requirements we established SS 3041. 
The Space control gaps were stealth capabilities for our satellites, enhanced satellite jamming 
capabilities and the ability to provide enemy satellites with undetectable false information. 
A lack of stealth capabilities for our satellites in the future is an acceptable risk. It is an 
acceptable risk because our future architecture is designed to have the protection capabilities. 
Our counter ASAT capability will provide our satellites with a layer of protection. If our 
counter ASAT program does fail our future architecture includes increased launch capability, 
which will be able to replace on orbit assets in a timely manner. 
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The absence of enhanced satellite jamming capabilities of our enemy is also an 
acceptable risk. At the current pace of technology development, terrestrial jamming systems 
will continue to improve and will be able to meet our mission requirements. Currently we have 
platforms such as the EA 6B Prowler and Rubicon-I/II. These assets can provide monitoring of 
the electromagnetic spectrum and actively deny an adversary the use of radar and 
communications. New platforms, such as the EA-18 Growler, are being developed to continue 
this mission into the future.   
The ability to provide enemy satellites with undetectable false information is also an 
acceptable risk for our future architecture. We identified this as a requirement for our future 
architecture as a means to achieve information superiority. Upon further research we found the 
military is actively pursuing several other means to achieve this goal. Information operations 
have become an extremely important aspect of military planning. Joint Publication 3-13 
outlines the process by which US forces can achieve and maintain information superiority 
throughout the battle space. We do not need to rely on space assets to achieve information 
superiority.  
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 As stated before, Team A’s tasks were to predict what the future NSSE environment 
would look like, identify what capability would be required to operate in that environment, and 
propose an architecture of solutions that would fill the gaps between the future required 
capability and current capabilities; all with the aim of providing unfettered access to any of those 
future capabilities across any combination of user and utility level.  Team A’s recommendation 
would be to sign on to invest almost $40 Billion in the final sixteen alternatives in order to 
ensure that all identified requirements are met and all risk related to the team’s prediction of the 
2025 environment would be accounted for.  However, the reality of the situation is that there are 
many stakeholders that necessarily don’t have an overall systemic view and are concerned with 
their particular mission area.  The team also realized that, to some of the stakeholders in the 
decision process, the benefits of space are transparent.  When the capability or product arrives, 
the stakeholders have no comprehension of where the product came from.  For space to be truly 
responsive to its customers, they won’t notice it until it goes away.  It is hard to convince such a 
customer that spending the time and effort to secure space and make it responsive is important.  
The team believes that majority of the decision makers will not see, as Team A does, that not 
fully implementing ORS, will generate more unacceptable risk than perhaps diverting funds from 
development of newer conventional weapons or a necessary re-organization of the NSSE.  
Although the team would like to close with a list of 16 alternatives and be done, the IPT will try 
and provide a logical method of implementing the alternatives, and perhaps, ways to ensure that 
all of our suggestions will eventually be incorporated into the NSSE architecture. 
 As with all results, the number of interpretations of the data typically equals the number 
of individuals that examine the data.   Also, lots of data doesn’t necessarily mean lots of quality 
data.  For this study, there were several weak points to the data collected based on ignorance of 
methods to collect data or lack of quality resources (e.g. cost, TRL).  The analysis of each 
alternative against the four criteria not only served to help make the final architecture decision 
but was also used to help determine when, how and why to implement particular alternatives.  In 
this analysis, the combined Responsiveness, Capability and Risk (RCR) was treated as one data 
point for each alternative and the cost of that alternative as another. 
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 Appendix G shows some graphs of the data collected during this study.  The first graph is 
a plot of cumulative RCR and cumulative cost data for the final sixteen alternatives.  The plot 
shows a somewhat linear increase in RCR against an almost exponential increase in cost from 
least expensive to most expensive.  The graph shows that, for a complete implementation of all 
sixteen alternatives, there is an approximate average of 45 points of RCR gained for every billion 
dollars spent, or 4.5 points of RCR for every one-hundred million spent.  
 The next graph is a plot of each alternative’s RCR per one-hundred million dollar spent 
against the total estimated cost for each alternative.  This graph is useful in that it readily 
identifies those alternatives that are a better investment for amount spent to total responsiveness 
gained.  Of note, the Space Support Single Space Agency alternative produces almost 49 times 
the average of RCR per $100M spent.  The graph also shows that the last five alternatives are all 
below the average of 4.5 points of RCR for every one-hundred million spent as derived from the 
first plot of data. 
 The final graph is perhaps the most useful for decision makers when analyzing which 
alternatives should get funded and which require more development and refinement before they 
can be considered for implementation.  This graph shows cumulative and normalized RCR to 
$100M spent and cumulative and normalized cost as percentages.  The graph also includes 
consideration to sensitivity analysis due to the low degree of certainty associated with a majority 
of the cost estimates in this study.  The graph shows Y-Error bars that represent the change in 
data should the total costs be underestimated by 100% and overestimated by 50%.  The 
sensitivity analysis shows that in all but the last five alternatives, no significant change in 
outcome would occur should the cost increase or decrease on the given scale. 
 From the analysis of these three graphs, Team A suggests the following three 
implementation schemes: 
 
1. Minimum Cost Implementation: 
 Implement the Space Support Single Space Agency Alternative only.  This would 
provide the most responsiveness (219 RCR points or 45% of total) at the least amount of 
cost ($110M or 0.3% of total costs).  Although this alternative is the cheapest and should 
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easily pass the rigorous acquisition process, it leaves a majority of the identified 
requirements for the 2025 environment unaccounted for. 
 
2. Best Tradeoff Implementation: 
 Implement all but the last five alternatives.  This implementation provides 98% of 
the total RCR available (approximately 1200 RCR points) for only 15% of the total 
estimated cost (approximately $6.2B).  This implementation plan puts the architecture as 
close to the forecast required as possible while maintaining a realistic price tag.  
However, the final five alternatives should not be discarded but investigated further to 
reduce price and  therefore increase the RCR to cost ratio.  As time progresses, all the 
alternatives will be refined through the application of better technology and better cost 
estimates, therefore, the final five may eventually be more affordable and provide more 
responsiveness. 
 
3. Complete Implementation: 
 Implement all sixteen alternatives for approximately 1800 RCR points at a cost of 
approximately $40B.  This alternative will not only be the most expensive but will also 
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VII. AREAS OF IMPROVEMENT AND FURTHER STUDY 
1. Method of Evaluation: 
 Team A believes that each of the criteria it used to evaluate each alternative was sound 
and should be included in any future analysis of alternatives for space architecture alternatives.  
However, the team also believes that there was room for improvement for how each was applied 
and graded.  For example, in both the responsiveness and capability criteria there was not 
allowance for a relative scale.  Being able to evaluate and track the relative usefulness and 
capability between different alternatives may have led to a more subjective comparison and may 
have shortened the decision iteration cycle. 
2. Technology Forecast: 
 Given the distant year of 2025 for final implementation, trying to forecast exactly what 
technology would be available proved extremely difficult.  Also, the relative inexperience of the 
IPT compared to that of the professionals that would actually develop the ORS architecture lends 
an air of artificiality to the selected TRL for each alternative.   Analysis should be conducted as 
to whether the reliance on open source material for data versus classified sources would have 
made a difference in assigned TRL.  Finally, no consideration was given to how much funding 
exists for current research into each alternative area and how much effort is taking place in each 
area.  This would have allowed for a relative weighting being applied to those technologies, that 
although relatively immature at the time of analysis were rapidly becoming mature and hence 
would have received a higher RCR score. 
3. Cost Estimation: 
 As with Technology Forecast, the lack of projectable data, lack of experience and 
possibly the lack of classified information may have all led to inaccurate numbers and a lowered 
degree of certainty.  However, by building in a +100% and -50% error into the final analysis, it 
was shown that there would be little to no change in our Team’s recommendation should the 
actual cost prove to be different than the original analysis. 
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• Enhanced satellite jamming capabilities  
• Anti-ASAT capabilities against kinetic weapons  
• Improved self-defense mechanisms for military satellites  
• Anti-ASAT capabilities across the spectrum of ASAT weapons  
• Stealth capabilities for our satellites 
 
 Prevention 
• Enhanced anti-jamming capabilities 
• Better encryption for our satellites 
 
 Negation 
• Enhanced satellite jamming capabilities 
• Anti-ASAT capabilities against kinetic weapons   
• Anti-ASAT capabilities across the spectrum of ASAT weapons  
• Capability to provide enemy satellites with undetectable false information 
 
 Surveillance 





 Indications, Tracking, Warning, and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) 
• Threat warning and assessment all the way to ground level 
 
 Environmental Monitoring (EM) 
• Integrated, real time weather [space and terrestrial] updates 
 
 Complete Integration with Terrestrial Systems 
• Common Database and ubiquitous interoperability with U.S/Allied systems 
 
 Communications 
• SATCOM bandwidth capable of handling surge requirements 
 
  
 Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) 
• Improved anti-jam/jam detection capabilities  
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 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
• Assured imagery for tactical requirements 




 Space Lift 
• Streamlined/minimized pre-pad & on-pad processing time 
• Alternative launch options for broadened orbit choices and increased launch capacity  
• Inexpensive, efficient, flexible lift vehicles 
 
 Launch On Demand 
• A " ready-alert” capacity (satellites & boosters) to launch a replacement satellite, of 
each mission type (IMINT, SIGINT, COMM, etc), within 72 hours 
 
 Satellite Operations / Telemetry, Tracking, & Control (TT&C) 
• Improved coordination and tasking of Intelligence/DoD satellite assets [ground] 
• All future assets capable of communicating with each other, regardless of mission 
area [on-orbit] 





• Maintain ICBM capabilities  
• Wide range of weaponry to be used from space against space targets on non-
permanent basis 
• Wide range of weaponry to be used from space against ground targets on permanent 
basis 
• Capabilities for useful loads (troops, logistics, weapons) delivered across the globe in 
hours 
• Joint/combined doctrine for use of weapons from space  
• Joint targeting process that allows commanders at all levels to incorporate space force 
applications into fires planning
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APPENDIX B – ORIGINAL SIXTY-ONE ORS ALTERNATIVES FOR 2025 
Space Support (SS) 
 
Space lift (SL)  
SS.SL.1 Maintain current launch pad infrastructure (Cape/VAFB) – double work shifts; plug & 
play  
• Decrease pre-pad and on-pad processing time-requirements by utilizing two work shifts 
vice one inside integration facilities  
o Decreases total processing time for Atlas from 60 to 30 days  
o Decreases total processing time for Delta from 24 to 12 days  
• Utilize plug and play components  
 
SS.SL.2 Modify current launch pad infrastructure (Cape/VAFB) – build additional HIFs & VIFs  
• Build additional Horizontal Integration Facilities (HIF) (Delta)  
o Construct five-bay HIFs for each launch pad at each launch site (six total) to 
include three bays for processing and two bays for storage  
o Decreases on-pad time to 3 days or less  
• Once the vehicle is integrated, a “transporter” will move the vehicle from the HIF/VIF to 
the actual launch pad for final processing/fueling (< 3 days)  
• Build additional Vertical Integration Facilities (VIF) (Atlas)  
 Need more info on building VIFs  
• Decrease pre-pad and on-pad processing time-requirements by utilizing two work shifts 
vice one inside integration facilities  
• Utilize plug and play components  
 
SS.SL.3 Build additional launch pads and increase infrastructure  
• 1 per site to increase Cape to five and VAFB to four; 9 total pads vice 7  
• Increases launch capacity from 18/yr to 23/yr for both sites  
 
SS.SL.4 Utilize Sea Launch and Spaceports as additional launch options  
• Sea Launch: Used to launch some NMM vehicles  
• Spaceports: Likely only support smaller-sized vehicles  
o Currently 8 operating/planned US spaceports  
 
SS.SL.5 Develop inexpensive, efficient, flexible lift vehicle(s) to launch smaller satellites  
• Falcon, Spaceship 1, or Commercial space lift  
 to reduce overall launch costs and provide increased access to space  
 to improve cost-effectiveness and capitalize on technology developments  
  
Launch On Demand / Reconstitution (LOD)  
SS.LOD.1 Ready Alert within 72 Hours  
• Satellites are already integrated, tested and stored in the HIF  
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• Utilize a plug-and-play payload and launch vehicle to enable periodic upgrades to stored 
spares or to trouble-shoot booster problems  
• Backfill launched “ready-alert” satellite within 4 weeks  
• Integrated booster/payload spare of each mission type stored at the contractor build site 
and shipped/ integrated/ stored within HIF  
 
SS.LOD.2 Build-and-launch replacements in weeks/months  
• Cookie-cutter satellite mission types to decrease procurement/ build times  
• Plug-play payload design to allow for upgrades both on the ground and on-orbit by 
autonomous robotic vehicles  
• Acquisition process done in advance  
• On-pad efficiencies reduce time while maintaining lowest possible risk  
 
SS.LOD.3 On-orbit spare(s) of each mission type  
 
Satellite Operations / TT&C (SO)  
SS.SO.1 Mobile Training Team  
• NGA, in coordination w/the IC, establish a mobile training team to educate national asset 
users at all levels on product request procedures and tools  
 
SS.SO.2 NTM Tasking Board  
• Prioritizes satellite tasking both daily and long-term  
• Rapid re-tasking - establish a Fusion Coordination Cell to monitor & assimilate real-time 
info from NTM and re-task assets as required to support both DoD & the IC “on-the-fly”  
 
SS.SO.3 Single Space Agency  
• Push decision down to the lowest level  
• COC and decision-making flat and quick  
• Coordination and tasking should happen in one location  
• Joint Command (DoD, IC, Gov’t Agencies)  
• NTM Tasking Board (prioritizes satellite tasking)  
o One overarching, joint-manned, tasking organization capable of making re-
tasking decisions  
o Establish a Fusion Coordination Cell to monitor & assimilate real-time info from 
NTM and re-task assets as required to support both DoD & the IC “on-the-fly”  
• Joint Space Acquisition Office (DoD, IC, Gov’t Agencies)  
 
SS.SO.4 Enable all future on-orbit assets to crosslink  
• All satellites include this capability in the design process starting in 2010  
 
SS.SO.5 Develop and employ an on-orbit satellite servicing capability (robotics) to conduct 





Force Application (FA) 
 
FA.1 Maintain current ICBM inventory and “balanced response” policy  
• Self explanatory  
 
FA.2 Phase out current inventory of ICBMs when/if deterrence achieved by rapid reaction force 
capability  
• Eventually replace “strategic reach” of ICBM with Rapid Reaction Force or Ballistic 
Conventional Weapon  
 
FA.3 Develop non-permanent effects weapons  
• Temporary effects such as dazzling, jamming, etc.  
 
FA.4 Develop permanent effects weapons  
• Lasting effects such as directed energy, kinetic kill, etc.  
 
FA.5 Hyper-sonic vehicle that can carry troops, supplies, and weapons  
• Ballistic trajectory vehicle deployable to any location worldwide in two hours or less.  
 
FA.6 Space-based pre-positioning capability for supplies and weapons  
 
FA.7 Develop Joint publication with input from all four services  
 
FA.8 Develop separate targeting process for space delivered effects  
 
FA.9 Integrate current joint fires targeting process for space delivered effects into processes 
 
Force Enhancement (FE) 
 
Indications, Tracking, Warning and Attack Assessment (IA)  
FE.IA.1 Continue with incremental improvements to our current architecture  
 
FE.IA.2 Create joint ventures with other countries and share costs and resources  
• Stop doing ITW/AA alone. Work with our allies to meet this need. By combining assets 
and resources a better product can be produced for a lower cost.  
 
Environmental Monitoring (E)  
FE.E.1 Continue with incremental improvements to our current architecture  
 
FE.E.2 Create joint ventures with other countries and share costs and resources  
• Stop doing environmental monitoring alone. Work with allied countries and 
organizations to meet this need. By combining assets and resources a better product can 
be produced for a lower cost.  
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Complete Integration with Terrestrial Systems (CI)  
FE.CI.1 Expand functionality of current information systems to include cross system sharing  
• Slowly but surely make our current information systems interoperable. This would 
include compatible data formats, an accepted communication protocol, and policies for 
access.  
 
FE.CI.2 Design, build and implement a new Integration Architecture  
• Design, build and implement a new information system architecture to meet the data 
requirements of all parties that involved in ORS.  
 
Communications (C)  
FE.C.1 Continue with incremental improvements to our current orbital architecture (Military & 
Commercial)  
 
FE.C.2 Develop, build and launch military owned and operated architecture  
Stop purchasing communication capabilities from commercial companies. Develop and deploy a 
communications architecture that gives us complete ownership and control.  
 
FE.C.3 Leverage the commercial market by deploying hosted payloads on future launches  
• Place military communications payloads on commercial satellites (like leasing the space 
on the satellite). We would have complete control of the payload. In times of excess 
capability we could sell bandwidth to commercial users.  
 
FE.C.4 Invest in and deploy high altitude airship platforms and payloads  
• High-altitude long-loiter airships are currently in development and offer persist coverage 
of a given region. This capability offers a way to augment our current orbital 
communications systems.  
 
Position, Navigation, and Timing (P)  
FE.P.1 Augment current architecture with GPS Block III enhancements  
• GPS Block III, when at Full Operational Capability (FOC), will provide several 
capabilities which will enhance anti-jamming capability.  
 
FE.P.2 Ensure interoperability with all other major Navigation constellations  
• Interoperability point is the same as that just made with GPS Block III  
 
FE.P.3 Implement Inertial Navigation Capabilities to operate until GPS Signal re- established  
• INS technologies are already being widely used in smart bombs. The idea here is to try to 
increase that capability to other non-weapon items to support continuous navigation 
(degraded) in the temporary absence of a reliable GPS signal.  
 
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (I)  
FE.I.1 Continue with incremental improvements to our current architecture  
 
FE.I.2 Lower classification of images to ease distribution  
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• Quantum cryptography or other highly secure means of protecting and transmitting these 
images at a lower security level could be employed  
 
FE.I.3 Add a secondary payload to each Iridium NEXT satellite to provide global EO coverage  
• Iridium is currently looking for partners to launch secondary payloads on their new 
constellation of 66 LEO comms satellites called “Iridium NEXT.”  
 
FE.I.4 Field a constellation of satellites in MEO to increase persistence  
• Adaptive Optics and Segmented Mirrors are being used on NASA’s James Webb Space 
Telescope. If applied to an Earth orbiting EO satellite the technology could provide a 
much larger aperture with high resolution capable in a MEO. This would result in both 
more dwell time (= responsiveness) and great protection from an ASAT attack. (61m 
aperture = .1 m GSD from 10,000 km)  
 
FE.I.5 Augment next generation of LEO EO satellites with high-altitude long-loiter airships  
• High-altitude long-loiter airships are currently in development and offer persist coverage 
of a given region. This capability offers a way to augment our current orbital systems for 
a number of mission areas.  
 
Space Control (SC) 
 
Protection (P)  
SC.P.1 Enhance satellite anti-jam capability  
 
SC.P.2 Establish ASAT early warning cell  
• Personnel and space surveillance assets dedicated to early warning against kinetic ASAT 
threats to friendly satellites  
 
SC.P.3 Develop terrestrial based counter-ASAT weapons  
• Terrestrial based counter-ASAT system will include both directed energy and kinetic 
weapons  
 
SC.P.4 Develop space based counter-ASAT weapons  
• System comprised of network of space based lasers and kinetic weapons  
 
SC.P.5 Require additional shielding on future sats  
• Will provide greater protection from space environment and EMP  
 
SC.P.6 Develop maneuver on demand capability  
• Maneuver on demand capability based on “orbital service station” concept  
 
SC.P.7 Develop filters to protect optical/IR focal planes  
• Filter/shutter will provide protection against laser dazzling  
 
SC.P.8 Develop radar evasive shapes and materials for sats  
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• Adapt current stealth technology for operation on satellites  
 
SC.P.9 Employ adaptive camouflage on sats  
• Adaptive camouflage would provide visible stealth  
 
Negation (N)  
SC.N.1 Continue to develop mobile terrestrial jammers  
• System will temporarily deny adversary use of communications satellites (within jammer 
footprint)  
 
SC.N.2 Equip future sats with jammers  
• On orbit jamming capability to temporarily deny use of communications satellites  
 
SC.N.3 Develop terrestrial based ASAT weapons  
• Terrestrial based counter-ASAT system will include both directed energy and kinetic 
weapons  
 
SC.N.4 Develop space based ASAT weapons  
• System comprised of network of space based lasers and kinetic weapons  
 
SC.N.5 Develop maneuver on demand capability  
• Maneuver on demand capability based on “orbital service station” concept  
 
SC.N.6 Develop filters to protect optical/IR focal planes  
• Filter/shutter will provide protection against laser dazzling  
 
Surveillance (S)  
SC.S.1 Continue use of terrestrial based surveillance telescopes and radars with incremental 
upgrades  
• Network of telescopes and radars to visually track adversary’s satellites from the ground  
 
SC.S.2 Develop space based surveillance network (radar & optical)  
 
SC.S.3 Add more electro-optical and radar sensors worldwide to minimize gaps in surveillance 
coverage  
 
Prevention (P)  
SC.PV.1 Require RF cross links on all future sats  
 
SC.PV.2 Require laser cross links on all future sats  
• Provides alternative to counter sat-to-sat RF interference; laser cross links have limited 
range (typically 40 km)  
 
SC.PV.3 Require encryption on all military leased commercial SATCOM and imagery  
• Prevent compromise of communications and satellite imagery from commercial satellites 
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1. Review each JP 3-13 Mission Area alternative and, in your expert opinion, 
decide whether the alternative will provide any level of responsiveness to each 
level of user at each level of utility. 
2. Place a check mark in the appropriate blank on the score sheet in and if the 
alternative will provide any level of increased responsiveness (only yes or no 
answer required; check if yes, leave blank if no) 
3. The score sheet is laid out with a particular row being assigned to one 
alternative and the particular user/utility level assigned to the columns.  
4. Total the number of check marks for each alternative and place the number in 
the “Total” Box at the end of the row. 
5. Please contact Maj Senn (masenn@nps.edu) or  
LT Hansen (kmhansen@nps.edu) if you have questions. 
6. Please complete the surveys by the 19 May. 
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APPENDIX D – RESPONSIVENESS, CAPABILITY, RISK AND COST 
SCORES 
 
Table 5: Responsiveness, Capability, Risk and Cost Scores
  78 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 79 
APPENDIX E – FINAL SIXTEEN ORS ALTERNATIVES FOR 2025 
Space Support (3) 
 
Space Launch (SS.SL.2): Modify current launch pad infrastructure (Cape/VAFB) – build 
additional HIFs  
• Build additional Horizontal Integration Facilities (HIF) (Delta)  
o Construct five-bay HIFs for each launch pad at each launch site (six total) to include 
three bays for processing and two bays for storage 
o Decreases on-pad time to 3 days or less  
 Once the vehicle is integrated, a “transporter” will move the vehicle from the 
HIF to the actual launch pad for final processing/fueling (< 3 days)  
• Decrease pre-pad and on-pad processing time-requirements by utilizing two work shifts vice 
one inside integration facilities  
• Utilize plug and play components  
 
Launch On Demand (SS.LOD.2H) Build-and-launch replacements in weeks for national systems 
and within 72 hours for small satellites such as TACSAT 
• Cookie-cutter satellite mission types to decrease procurement/ build times  
• Plug-play payload design to allow for upgrades both on the ground and on-orbit by 
autonomous robotic vehicles  
• Acquisition process done in advance  
• On-pad efficiencies reduce time while maintaining lowest possible risk  
 
Satellite Operations / Tracking, Telemetry & Control (SS.SO.1, SS, SO, 2, SS.SO.3):           
Single Space Agency  
• Push decision down to the lowest level  
• COC and decision-making flat and quick  
• Coordination and tasking should happen in one location  
• Joint Command (DoD, IC, Gov’t Agencies)  
• NTM Tasking Board (prioritizes satellite tasking both daily and long-term) 
o One overarching, joint-manned, tasking organization capable of making re-
tasking decisions  
o Rapid re-tasking: Establish a Fusion Coordination Cell to monitor & assimilate 
real-time info from NTM and re-task assets as required to support both DoD & 
the IC “on-the-fly”  
• Joint Space Acquisition Office (DoD, IC, Gov’t Agencies)  
• Mobile Training Teams 
o NGA, in coordination with the IC, establish a mobile training team to educate 
national asset users at all levels on product request procedures and tools 
 
Force Application (2) 
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Transport (FA.5):  Hyper-sonic vehicle that can carry troops, supplies, and weapons 
• Ballistic trajectory vehicle deployable to any location worldwide in two hours or less. 
 
Space Weapons (FA.3, FA.4):  As required, develop a combination of permanent and non-
permanent effects space-based weapons against terrestrial targets 
• Temporary effects include dazzling, jamming, etc… 
• Lasting effects include directed energy, kinetic kill, etc… 
 
Force Enhancement (7) 
 
Indications, Tracking, Warning, and Attack Assessment (FE.IA.2): Create joint ventures with 
other countries and share costs and resources  
• Stop doing ITW/AA alone. Work with our allies to meet this need. By combining assets and 
resources a better product can be produced for a lower cost.  
 
Environmental Monitoring (FE.E.2): Create joint ventures with other countries and share costs 
and resources  
• Stop doing environmental monitoring alone. Work with allied countries and organizations to 
meet this need. By combining assets and resources a better product can be produced for a 
lower cost.  
 
Complete Integration with Terrestrial Systems (FE.CI.1): Expand functionality of current 
information systems to include cross system sharing (joint, interoperable protocol system) 
• Slowly but surely make our current information systems interoperable. This would include 
compatible data formats, an accepted communication protocol, and policies for access.  
 
Communications (FE.C.3): Leverage the commercial market by deploying hosted payloads on 
future launches  
• Place military communications payloads on commercial satellites (like leasing the space on 
the satellite). We would have complete control of the payload. In times of excess capability 
we could sell bandwidth to commercial users.  
 
Position, Navigation, and Timing (FE.P.3): Implement Inertial Navigation Capabilities to operate 
until GPS Signal re- established  
• INS technologies are already being widely used in smart bombs. The idea here is to try to 
increase that capability to other non-weapon items to support continuous navigation 
(degraded) in the temporary absence of a reliable GPS signal.  
 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (FE.I.3): Add a secondary payload to each 
Iridium NEXT satellite to provide persistent global Electro-Optical (EO) coverage  
• Iridium is currently looking for partners to launch secondary payloads on their new 
constellation of 66 LEO communication satellites called “Iridium NEXT.”  
 
Tactical Communication & Imaging (FE.C.4, FE.I.5):  Invest and deploy high-altitude long-loiter 
airships capable of providing communications and imagery to warfighters in the theater 
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• Augment the airships with current orbital communications systems and LEO EO satellites.  
Airships offer persistent coverage for a given region.  Airships are currently in development. 
 
 
Space Control (4) 
 
Protection (SC.P.7, SC.P.1):  Develop protection capability through the entire EM spectrum for 
all national space assets (includes protection against laser dazzling and communication jamming)  
 
Negation (SC.N.3):  Develop terrestrial-based counter ASAT system (both directed energy & 
kinetic weapons) 
 
Surveillance (SC.S.3): Add more electro-optical and radar sensors worldwide to minimize gaps 
in surveillance coverage and to provide more accurate Space Situational Awareness (SSA)  
 
Prevention (SC.PV.1, SC.PV.2, SS.SO.4): Shift to laser cross links on all future satellites while 
maintaining RF cross links on legacy systems
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APPENDIX F – OVERALL SCORES 
 
Table 6: Overall Scores for Alternatives Included in Final Architecture
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APPENDIX G – DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 
Figure 4: Cumulative RCR and Cost 
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Figure 6: Normalized Cumulative RCR/$ and Cost
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